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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we consider differential games for multi-agent systems under distributed in-
formation where every agent is only able to acquire information about the others according to a
directed information graph of local communication/sensor networks. Such games arise naturally
from many applications including mobile robot coordination, power system optimization, multi-
player pursuit-evasion games, etc. Since the admissible strategy of each agent has to conform to
the information graph constraint, the conventional game strategy design approaches based upon
Riccati equation(s) are not applicable because all the agents are required to have the information
of the entire system. Accordingly, the game strategy design under distributed information is com-
monly known to be challenging. Toward this end, we propose novel open-loop and feedback game
strategy design approaches for Nash equilibrium and noninferior solutions with a focus on linear
quadratic differential games. For the open-loop design, approximate Nash/noninferior game strate-
gies are proposed by integrating distributed state estimation into the open-loop global-information
Nash/noninferior strategies such that, without global information, the distributed game strategies
can be made arbitrarily close to and asymptotically converge over time to the global-information
strategies. For the feedback design, we propose the best achievable performance indices based ap-
proach under which the distributed strategies form a Nash equilibrium or noninferior solution with
respect to a set of performance indices that are the closest to the original indices. This approach
overcomes two issues in the classical optimal output feedback approach: the simultaneous opti-
mization and initial state dependence. The proposed open-loop and feedback design approaches are
applied to an unmanned aerial vehicle formation control problem and a multi-pursuer single-evader
differential game problem, respectively. Simulation results of several scenarios are presented for
illustration.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the basic background knowledge of differential game theory, multi-agent systems,
and distributed information structures is covered, the motivation of this research is raised, and the
scope of this dissertation is defined.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Differential Game Theory
The game theory was originated from economics [1] in 1940s and has been widely applied in many
areas such as control systems engineering, military and aerospace engineering, power systems,
communication network, biomedical science, etc. It has been extensively studied and explored
by many researchers in the past decades and becomes a quite mature area nowadays. The game
theory basically deals with situations where two or more players are involved and making deci-
sions to pursue their own objectives which could be their profits, performance, or utility functions
in applications. Each player makes its own decision to achieve certain outcome of its objective
function. This decision is called the player’s strategy. A set that contains all the possible strategies
from which the player can choose in the game is called the player’s admissible strategy set.
During the development of the game theory, different types of games have emerged. Some typical
classifications of the games are introduced as follows:
1. In terms of the time dependence of the strategy, there are static games and dynamic games.
In a static game, every player only makes a one-shot strategy. Moreover, for a two-player
static game, if every player’s admissible strategy set contains a finite number of strategies,
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the game is also called a matrix game. That is because the outcomes corresponding to all
the possible combinations of the two players’ admissible strategies can be put into a matrix
form.
In a dynamic game, every player makes a strategy profile or trajectory as a function of
(continuous or discrete) time for the entire game process. If the players’ state dynamics
are governed by differential equations, then the game is also called a differential game and
the objective functions that the players try to maximize or minimize are usually called the
performance indices.
2. In terms of the players’ willingness to collaborate, there are noncooperative games and co-
operative games.
In a noncooperative game, every player is assumed to focus on pursuing its own objective
only and not to collaborate with others. A typical solution to the noncooperative game is the
well-known Nash equilibrium [2]. The Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a state where
no player has the intend to unilaterally deviate from its strategy and if it does so, then a loss
will occur in its objective function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium can be regarded as a
“safe” solution to prevent any player from cheating and is preferred in many applications
of games with noncooperative players. The Nash equilibrium can be obtained by utilizing
the standard static optimization technique for the static game and by utilizing the optimal
control theory [3] for the dynamic game. Note that the existence or uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium for a noncooperative game is not always guaranteed.
In a cooperative game, although individual players have their own objective, they are as-
sumed to collaborate with each other to jointly improve their objective functions. Therefore,
a cooperative game are also regarded as a multi-objective optimization problem. A typical
solution to the cooperative game is called the noninferior solution or Pareto optimality [4].
The noninferior solution can be interpreted as a state where it is impossible to improve any
2
player’s objective function without loss in at least one player’s objective function. To obtain
the noninferior solution, only a single optimization problem needs be solved with the objec-
tive function being a convex combination of all the players’ objective functions. For all the
different choices of convex parameters, a noninferior set or Pareto frontier can be generated.
Note that unlike the Nash equilibrium, the player has the intend to deviate from the noninfe-
rior solution unilaterally. As such, the noninferior solution is preferred in the situation where
all the players in the game are restricted to stick with the noninferior strategy or within the
same team.
3. In terms of the strategy making sequence, there are Nash games and Stackelberg games for
noncooperative games. In a Nash game, all the players make decisions simultaneously and
the Nash equilibrium can be obtained as we have already introduced. While in a Stackelberg
game, there exists a sequence of decision making, that is, some of the players will make
decisions first as the leaders and announce their strategies to the rest of the players, and the
rest of the players as followers will then make decisions to react to the leaders’ announced
strategies. In a Stackelberg game, it is assumed that all the followers are rational and will
react to the leaders’ strategies in an optimal way. Knowing that the following will react
optimally, the leaders will naturally announce strategies that will optimize their objective
functions. The players’ strategies are said to be Stackelberg strategies. Clearly, the leaders
in a Stackelberg game has the advantage over the followers under the condition that they
have to know the objectives of all the followers. A typical example of the Stackelberg games
is the oligopoly market where there are several big dominated companies as the leaders and
the other small companies as the followers. The big companies usually have information
advantage over the small companies and their policies have great impact on these small
companies.
4. In terms of the relationship among the players’ objective functions, there are zero-sum games
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and nonzero-sum games. In a zero-sum game, the sum of all the players’ objective functions
is equal to zero. Therefore, the total gain in some players’ objective functions is equal to
the total loss in the other players’ objective functions. Therefore, the players have conflict
objectives. In a zero-sum game, the Nash equilibrium is also known as a saddle-point solu-
tion. One typical example of the zero-sum games is the one-pursuer one-evader game where
the pursuer tries to minimize the distance between the evader and itself at the terminal time
while the evader tries to maximize such a distance.
In a nonzero-sum game, the sum of all the players’ objective functions is not equal to zero.
In this research, since we focus on the differential games, in what follows, the historical develop-
ment of the differential games is briefly introduced and the associated literatures are reviewed.
It has been commonly regarded that the introductory work on the differential game theory was done
by Isaacs in 1950s with major applications in military situations and pursuit-evasion games. His
book [5] focuses on the zero-sum differential games and the well-known Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
partial differential equation for deriving the feedback Nash Strategy was proposed. From Isaacs’
pioneering work on, a plenty of results on differential games have been coming out consistently.
Necessary conditions for a certain type of differential games to have a saddle point solution were
derived in [6], where the calculus of variation technique was utilized first time in the differential
games. One of the most important works on nonzero-sum games is [7]. This paper focuses on both
static and differential nonzero-sum games. Three types of solutions were discussed, that is, the
Nash equilibrium, minmax solution, and noninferior solution (later known as the solution to the
cooperative game). The Nash equilibrium of the nonzero-sum linear quadratic game was obtained
by solving the the coupled differential matrix Riccati equations. In [8], an important property of
the linear quadratic differential games was discovered that the limiting solution of the coupled dif-
ferential Riccati equations does not necessarily become the solution to the game over the infinity
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time. In [9, 10, 11], the uniqueness and existence of the Nash equilibrium for linear quadratic
games were studied. In parallel with the research on differential Nash games, there exist many
research works on differential Stackelberg games. Static and differential Stackelberg game was in-
vestigated in [12, 13]. In [12], the Stackelberg solution was derived for linear quadratic differential
games. In [13], the important property of the Stackelberg solution, the inconsistency, was discussed
and hence it was shown that the well-known Bellman’s optimality principle does not hold for the
Stackelberg games. The existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg solution were further studied
in [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. After 1980, the research works started focusing on the potential applications
of the differential game theory to all kinds of real life applications. In [19], the idea of differential
game theory was successfully applied to the H∞ robust optimal control design problem where the
designer is regarded as one player and the noise is regarded as the other player. In [20], the output
consensus problem was formulated and solved under the cooperative differential game framework.
In [21], a problem where a group of agents as defenders are trying to protect an asset from being
destroyed by an intruder was considered and solved as a linear quadratic differential game. In [22],
the online solution for the differential games was considered using the reinforcement learning. In
[23], the interaction between the microgrid and main grid in the future smart grid was formulated
as a discrete time Stackelberg game and the optimal generation dispatch are obtained. Among a va-
riety of interesting applications of the differential game theory, the pursuit-evasion game has been
widely studied for decades. A pursuit-evasion game basically models the process where several
pursuers try to chase several evaders for a certain period of time, while the evaders try to escape
at the same time. Solving a pursuit-evasion game essentially involves developing strategies for
the pursuers and evaders such that their prescribed performance indices are optimized. After the
pioneering work [5], the saddle point solutions for a type of zero-sum single-pursuer single-evader
games were considered in [24]. Nonzero-sum pursuit-evasion games were introduced and investi-
gated as an example of the Nash equilibrium strategies in [7] and as an example of leader-follower
Stackelberg strategies in [12]. In [25], a two-pursuer one-evader game was considered. In [26],
5
a two-evader one-pursuer cooperative defending game was considered. In [27], the structured
strategies on improving the cooperative pursuit was discussed. In [28, 29, 30], pursuit-evasion
games with formation control that makes pursuers spread around the evader were studied. In [31],
a homicidal chauffeur game with collaborative pursuers was discussed. In [32, 33], a derivative
based strategy design approach was proposed for multi-player pursuit-evasion games. In [34],
pursuit-evasion games integrating communication theory to deal with the spatial jamming problem
was discussed. In [35, 36], multi-player pursuit-evasion game with evaders having higher speed
than the pursuers was considered. The conventional multi-player pursuit-evasion games assume
that either the pursuers or the evaders are able to have global information of the overall system,
that is, every pursuer is able to observe all the other pursuers and evaders, and every evader is
able to observe all the other pursuers and evaders. However, in many applications of the pursuit-
evasion game, the players (either the pursuers or the evaders) might only be able to have limited
information of the overall system. For instance, due to the sensing range capability or the obstacles
in the environment, each player might have a limited capability to observe a subset of the players
in the game. This type of multi-player pursuit-evasion games with incomplete information were
investigated in [37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. A short survey [42] is recommended as a dedicated report on
the pursuit-evasion games.
1.1.2 Multi-Agent Systems
As the modern system becomes more complex and large-scaled, a single system usually consist of
several subsystems (or agents). This type of systems are called multi-agent systems. The control
objective of such a system is to coordinate the subsystems to complete a certain task while at the
same time maintaining the stability of the overall system. In most of the multi-agent systems, to
achieve the coordination among the agents, there usually exists local communication or sensor
networks such that the agents are able to exchange certain information with each others through
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the networks. In recent years, there is a surge of research works on such systems with the potential
applications in multi-vehicle coordination, signal synchronization, distributed generator control in
the future smart grid, etc. In what follows, we will briefly review the research subjects and existing
results on the multi-agent systems.
A large part of the research works on multi-agent systems are dedicated to the consensus problem
[43, 44, 45]. This problem is essentially designing control inputs for the agents such that their out-
puts under these controls become identical as time goes to infinite. The control design to achieve
a consensus in the multi-agent systems is also known as the cooperative control design [46] which
is generally a control law that utilizes the information available to individual agents only. The
consensus problem can be better illustrated by the following typical applications. A rendezvous
problems is a consensus problem where a group of agents (e.g. mobile vehicles) needs be con-
trolled to arrive at a common location in a physical environment. Note that the final rendezvous
location achieved by the agents does not need to be predetermined under the typical consensus
algorithm or cooperative control law. A flocking problem is a consensus problem where a group of
agents (e.g. mobile vehicles) needs be controlled to achieve a common constant velocity. Note that
similar to the rendezvous problem, the final common velocity achieved by the agents does not need
to be predetermined under the typical consensus algorithm or cooperative control law. A formation
control problem [47, 48, 49] is a consensus problem where a group of agents needs be controlled
to form a prescribed formation. The formation control problem can be regarded as a combination
of a rendezvous problem and flocking problem because the formation control problem is a ren-
dezvous problem where the prescribed formation distance between any two agents is zero and the
formation control problem is also a flocking problem where agents’ velocities must be identical
to preserve the formation. A synchronization problem [50, 51, 52, 53] is a consensus problem
where the agents’ outputs need be controlled to track a prescribed reference trajectory. Unlike
the previous rendezvous, flocking, and formation control problems where the consensus value is
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identical and constant as times goes to infinity, the reference trajectory as the consensus value of
the synchronization problem is usually time-varying. Synchronization problems has great poten-
tial applications in power generation industry in terms of synchronization of the voltage, phase,
or frequency among a large number of distributed generators in the future smart grid. As we can
clearly see from the above applications, the consensus is a “stable” status of a multi-agent system,
however, is different from the conventional concept of stability where all the states or outputs of the
agents vanish as the time goes to infinite. Therefore, to distinguish with the conventional concept,
the stability for the consensus of multi-agent systems is called the cooperative stability, which is a
status where an agreement on all the agents’ states of interest is achieved.
Another research area is dedicated to the optimal control design in the multi-agent systems. The
optimal control design for a multi-agent system is essentially finding the control input compatible
with the communication or sensor network for each and every agent such that a given performance
index is minimized. Due to the communication or sensor network constraint, the classical optimal
control design approach [3] is generally not applicable. For instance, since the linear feedback
control for each agent has to be structured, the well-known Riccati equation approach for the
linear quadratic optimal control is not applicable because the feedback gain matrix obtained by
this approach is a full matrix in general. As such, a different optimal control design approach
must be proposed for multi-agent systems. In what follows, we briefly introduce major research
directions toward solving this problem (with the focus on linear systems). There are approaches
based on optimal output feedback control design. Since the linear feedback control in a multi-
agent system can be treated as multiple control inputs with different output feedback channels,
the problem can be solved under the framework of optimal output feedback control design. The
pioneering works on the optimal output feedback control design are [54, 55] where the basic idea
is to parameterize the gain matrix and optimize it directly with respect to the given performance
index. In these papers, an gradient based iterative algorithm for computing the optimal feedback
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matrix was proposed for the finite and infinite time horizon. The computational complexity of this
algorithm was later shown to be NP-hard in [56]. A comprehensive survey on the optimal output
feedback control was included in [57]. Applying the optimal output feedback control design to
the multi-agent systems was discussed in [58] in terms of optimal decentralized control design and
a numerical algorithm similar to the one in [54] was proposed. There are approaches based on
the transformation technique. In [59], the optimal decentralized control for a string of vehicles
was derived using the spatial transformation technique, where the dynamics and the information
exchange pattern were assumed to be identical for every vehicle. In [60, 61], the transformation
technique was further explored and the property of identical agents’ dynamics and information
exchange pattern was defined as spatially invariance. There are approaches based on the convex
optimization technique. Since the optimal control design for multi-agent systems is generally a
non-convex problem, the conventional convex optimization tools cannot be applied. In [62, 63],
this non-convex problem was recasted as a convex problem under rather strict conditions. Other
approaches include the graph approach [64] and linear quadratic approach for identical systems
[65]. The optimal control problem for multi-agent system has been investigated for a long time
and commonly regarded as a very hard problem.
There are research works that utilize the differential game theory to solve the multi-agent control
problem. In [66], the formation control problem was formulated as a noncooperative differential
game and the receding horizon Nash equilibrium was solved. In [67], the consensus problem was
formulated as a cooperative differential game and the Nash bargain solution among the Pareto-
efficient solutions was found using linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach. In [68], a zero-sum
game was formulated between the sensor network and an intelligent moving target, and a robust
target position estimator was obtained.
There are many other research areas on multi-agent systems, including robust control, time-delay
control, network optimization, etc, which cannot be fully covered in this dissertation. A compre-
9
hensive review on the multi-agent systems can be found in [69].
1.1.3 Distributed Information Structures
An important factor of a differential game is each player’s information structure. In a differential
game, each player’s information structure is extremely important because its strategy profile re-
sulted from the different information structures can be completely different. There are two typical
information structures. One is the open-loop information structure and the other is the feedback
information structure. Consequently, we call the open-loop strategy for the player’s strategy un-
der open-loop information structure and feedback strategy for the player’s strategy under feedback
information structure.
In the conventional game, the information available to the player is assumed to be “global” where
every player is assumed to have the information of all the other players in the game. Therefore, in
this case, the player is under open-loop information structure if only the global information of the
system at the initial time is available to it along the game process as shown in Figure 1.1.
t
0
Global Information
Figure 1.1: Global open-loop information structure
The player is under feedback information structure if the global information of the system is avail-
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able to it at every instant of time along the game process as shown in Figure 1.2.
t0
…... …...
Global InformationGlobal Information Global Information
Figure 1.2: Global feedback information structure
If the game takes place in a large-scale system such as a multi-agent system, each agent is only
able to have the information of a subset of (possibly neighboring) agents through the local com-
munication or sensor networks. In this situation, since the global information is not available any
more, the players are said to have distributed information. Therefore, we can extend the concepts
of open-loop and feedback information structures under distributed information. The distributed
open-loop information structure is shown in Figure 1.3 where the blue subset inside the circle (the
global information) stands for the distributed information available to the player.
t
0
Distributed 
Information
Figure 1.3: Distributed open-loop information structure
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The distributed feedback information structure is shown in Figure 1.4 where the blue subset inside
the circle (the global information) stands for the distributed information available to the player.
t0
…... …...
Distributed 
Information
Distributed 
Information
Distributed 
Information
Figure 1.4: Distributed feedback information structure
Moreover, the strategy under distributed open-loop information structure is called the distributed
open-loop strategy and the strategy under distributed feedback information is called the distributed
feedback strategy.
1.2 Motivation and Scope
The motivation of this dissertation lies in the following two aspects.
1. The first aspect is that most of the existing results on differential games assume that every
player has global information and the games under distributed information have not been
well studied, which is in fact quite common and important in many applications involving
large-scale systems, such as multi-agent systems.
2. The second aspect is that in conventional multi-agent control design problem, the agents are
assumed to pursue a goal of optimizing a common performance index. However, it is of
12
practical interest to consider a situation where individual agents try to optimize their own
objective functions.
The above two aspects actually lead to considering the differential game problem for multi-agent
systems under distributed information. So far, there are very few research works in this area.
Therefore, it is in a great demand to propose a strategy design approach such that each agent only
utilizes the information available to it. In this dissertation, we will focus on the linear quadratic
differential games in the multi-agent system where the dynamics of each agent is governed by
a linear differential equation and the performance index of each agent is in the quadratic form.
We will consider the design approaches of Nash equilibrium and noninferior solutions under both
distributed open-loop and feedback information structures. The remainder of this dissertation is
organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, the linear quadratic differential games in the multi-agent system under distributed
information is formulated.
In Chapter 3, the open-loop strategy design based upon Riccati equation is introduced first. A
distributed strategy design approach is then proposed by integrating a novel distributed state esti-
mation law.
In Chapter 4, the feedback strategy design based upon Riccati equation and the classical design
based upon optimal output feedback control are introduced first. A distributed strategy design
approach is then proposed based on a novel concept of the best achievable performance indices.
In Chapter 5, the proposed approaches are applied to an unmanned aerial vehicle formation control
problem and a multi-pursuer single-evader differential game problem with limited observations.
13
In Chapter 6, the dissertation is concluded with the summary of the results obtained in this research
and the future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this chapter, the linear quadratic differential game in an N-agent system is formulated and
formal definitions of related concepts are given.
2.1 System Dynamics
There are N agents who have decoupled linear dynamics and given by
x˙i(t) = Ai(t)xi(t) + Bˆi(t)ui(t) (2.1a)
yi(t) = Ci(t)xi(t), (2.1b)
for i = 1, · · · , N , where xi ∈ Rni is the state vector, ui ∈ Rmi is the control input, yi ∈ Rr is the
output vector. Matrices Ai(t), Bˆi(t), Ci(t) are time-varying and of proper dimensions. Since each
agent is an independent entity in real life applications, we assume that {Ai, Bi} is a controllable
pair, matrix Bi is of full column rank (meaning no redundant input), and matrix Ci is of full row
rank (meaning no redundant output). Agent i’s initial state is given by xi0 = xi(0). Note that all
the agents’ outputs have the same dimension, which is normally required by most of the multi-
agent system applications such as formation control, synchronization, pursuit-evasion games, etc.
Denoting x = [xT1 · · · xTN ]T and y = [yT1 · · · yTN ]T , the overall system can be expressed more
compactly as
x˙(t) = A(t)x(t) +
N∑
j=1
Bj(t)uj(t) (2.2a)
y(t) = C(t)x(t), (2.2b)
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where
A(t) =


A1(t)
.
.
.
AN(t)

 , Bi(t) =


0n1×mi
.
.
.
Bˆi(t)
.
.
.
0nN×mi


, C(t) =


C1(t)
.
.
.
CN(t)

 , (2.3)
where 0nj×mi is the nj × mi zero matrix for j = 1, · · · , N and matrix Bˆi(t) is the ith block of
matrix Bi(t).
2.2 Information Structure
The agents in the system is able to exchange information with others through the communica-
tion/sensor network. This information exchange pattern or information flow among the agents is
often described by a directed information graph denoted by G(t) = (V, E(t)) where node vi ∈ V
represents agent i for i = 1, · · · , N and edge eij ∈ E represents the directional information flow
from node j to node i (it is always true that eii ∈ E since agent i can always have its own in-
formation). If the information exchange pattern is fixed over time, then the graph is fixed. If the
information exchange pattern changes over time (due to possible communication failure or obsta-
cles in the environment, etc.), then the graph is time-varying. In this dissertation, we primarily
consider the fixed information exchange pattern and hence we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The information graph in the multi-agent system is fixed.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows a fixed information graph among four agents.
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Figure 2.1: Information graph among four agents
Clearly, in this graph, V = {v1, v2, v3, v4} and E = {e11, e22, e33, e44, e21, e31, e41, e23, e34}. Several
important concepts related with the information graph are introduced as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Path). In directed graph G, a path from node vi to node vj is a sequence of directed
edges that connect from node i to node j.
Based on the definition of path, the globally reachable node can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Globally Reachable Node). In directed graph G, node vi is globally reachable if
there exist paths from node vi to node vj for all j = 1, · · · , N, j 6= i.
In some literature, the globally reachable node is also regarded as the root node of the spanning
tree of the graph. Furthermore, based on the definition of globally reachable node, the graph
connectivity is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Connected Graph). Directed graph G is connected if it contains at least one glob-
ally reachable node.
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One important matrix associated in the graph theory is the Laplacian matrix [70]. This matrix is
denoted as L = [Lij ], where
Lij =


−lij if eij ∈ E and i 6= j∑N
j=1,j 6=i lik if i = j
0 otherwise
, (2.4)
where lij is a positive scalar. For example, the Laplacian matrix associated with the graph in Figure
2.1 is given by
L =


0 0 0 0
−l21 l21 + l23 −l23 0
−l31 0 l31 + l34 −l34
−l41 0 0 l41


.
The Laplacian matrix has numerous well-known properties, two of which are presented as follows:
Proposition 2.1. The Laplacian matrix has the following properties:
1. If a directed graph is connected, then the null space of the associated Laplacian matrix is
spanned by a single vector 1N , where 1N is an N × 1 vector with all the entries equal to 1.
2. All the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix associated with any directed graph have non-
negative real parts.
The above concepts of the graph theory in fact describe the distributed information among the
agents. For the differential game in the N-agent system, the distributed open-loop and feedback
information structure can be formally defined as follows:
• agent i is under the open-loop information structure if its strategy at time t can only depends
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on the initial output of agent j, yj(0), for all j such that eij ∈ E on the directed information
graph G.
• agent i is under the feedback information structure if its strategy at time t can only depend
on the output of agent j, yj(t), at the current time t for all j such that eij ∈ E on the directed
information graph G.
2.3 Performance Indices
In the multi-agent system, each agent tries to minimize its own performance index. In this disser-
tation, we consider the following performance indices for the agents:
Ji =
1
2
‖y(tf)‖
2
Fi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
[‖y(t)‖2Qi(t) + ‖ui(t)‖
2
Ri(t)
]dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (2.5)
where where tf is the terminal time of the game, ‖ui(t)‖2Ri(t) = u
T
i (t)Ri(t)ui(t), and matrix Ri(t)
is positive definite to ensure the convexity. Matrices Fi and Qi are usually positive semi-definite,
however, some exception exists (e.g. pursuit-evasion games). The above performance indices
can be utilized to characterize a plenty of applications in multi-agent systems. Several typical
applications of the multi-agent system characterized by performance index (2.5) with the different
choices of matrices Fi and Qi are presented and explained as follows.
1. Output Regulation. In this application, matrices Fi, Qi, and Ri are positive definite for all
i = 1, · · · , N . A typical choice of the coefficients for the output regulation that takes the
information graph into account is
‖y(tf)‖
2
Fi
=
∑
eij∈E
fij‖yj(tf)‖
2
2 and ‖y(t)‖2Qi(t) =
∑
eij∈E
qij(t)‖yj(t)‖
2
2.
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where ‖ · ‖2 stands for the Euclidean norm and fij, qij(t) are positive scalars for all j =
1, · · · , N and all t ∈ [0, tf ]. In this case, performance index (2.5) essentially means that
agent i tries to drive the entire output vector to zero while at the same time minimizing its
control effort over the entire process.
2. Output Consensus. In this application, matrices Fi and Qi are positive semi-definite for all
i = 1, · · · , N and matrix Ri is positive definite for all i = 1, · · · , N . A typical choice of the
coefficients for the output consensus that takes the information graph into account is
‖y(tf)‖
2
Fi
=
∑
eij∈E
fij‖yi(tf )− yj(tf )‖
2
2 and ‖y(t)‖2Qi(t) =
∑
eij∈E
qij(t)‖yi(t)− yj(t)‖
2
2.
In this case, performance index (2.5) essentially means that agent i tries to drive all the output
vectors (or part of the output vectors) to a common value while at the same time minimizing
its control effort over the entire process.
3. Multi-Pursuit Single-Evasion Game. Suppose that the output yi stands for agent i’s posi-
tion and agents 2 toN (pursuers) try to chase agent 1 (evader) who tries to evade the pursuers.
In this situation, the performance indices of the agents are given by (2.5) where matrices F1
and Q1 are negative definite, matrix R1 is positive definite, matrices Fi and Qi are positive
definite for all i = 2, · · · , N , and matrix Ri is positive definite for all i = 2, · · · , N . A
typical choice of the coefficients is
‖y(tf)‖
2
Fi
= fi‖yi(tf )− y1(tf )‖
2
2, ‖y(tf)‖
2
F1
= −
N∑
j=1
f1j‖y1(tf )− yj(tf)‖
2
2,
‖y(t)‖2Qi(t) = qi(t)‖yi(t)− y1(t)‖
2
2, ‖y(t)‖
2
Q1(t)
= −
N∑
j=1
q1j(t)‖y1(t)− yj(t)‖
2
2,
where fi, qi, f1j , and q1j are positive scalars for all j = 2, · · · , N . In this case, performance
index J1 essentially means that the evader tries to maximize its distances to the pursuers
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while at the same time minimizing its control effort over the entire process and on the other
hand, performance index Ji for all i = 2, · · · , N essentially means that the pursuer i tries to
minimize its distances to the evader while at the same time minimizing its control effort over
the entire process.
2.4 Game Solutions
Given the system equation in (2.2) and performance indices in (2.5), a differential game problem
is formulated. In this dissertation, we consider both the noncooperative game and the cooperative
game for the multi-agent system and the different types of solutions to these games are introduced
as follows. If the differential game for the N-agent system is noncooperative, the Nash equilibrium
[2] is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Nash Equilibrium). For the differential game in the N-agent system defined by
system dynamics in (2.2) and performance indices in (2.5), the strategies u∗1, · · · , u∗N form a Nash
equilibrium if the inequalities
Ji(u
∗
1, · · · , u
∗
N) ≤ Ji(u
∗
1, · · · , u
∗
i−1, ui, u
∗
i+1, u
∗
N) ∀ui ∈ Ui ∀i = 1, · · · , N (2.6)
hold, where Ui is agent i’s admissible strategy set.
Moreover, the ε-Nash equilibrium for the noncooperative differential game for the N-agent system
is defined as follows:
Definition 2.5 (ε-Nash equilibrium). Given the differential game in an N-agent system defined by
system dynamics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9) and a real non-negative parameter
ε, the agents’ strategies are said to form an ε-Nash equilibrium if it is not possible for any agent
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to reduce more than ε in its performance index value by unilaterally deviating from its strategy.
Formally, strategies u1, · · · , uN form an ε-Nash Equilibrium if the inequalities
Ji(u
∗
1, · · · , u
∗
N) ≤ Ji(u
∗
1, · · · , u
∗
i−1, ui, u
∗
i+1, · · · , u
∗
N) + ε ∀ui ∈ Ui, i = 1, · · · , N. (2.7)
hold, where Ui is agent i’s admissible strategy set.
It is clear that every Nash Equilibrium is equivalent to an ε-Nash equilibrium where ε = 0. If the
differential game for the N-agent system is cooperative, the noninferior solution (also known as
the Pareto optimality solution) is defined as follows:
Definition 2.6 (Noninferior Solution). For the differential game in an N-agent system defined
by system dynamics in (2.2) and performance indices in (2.5), the strategies u∗1, · · · , u∗N form a
noninferior solution if there exists i ∈ {1, · · · , N} such that the inequalities
Ji(u1, · · · , uN) ≤ Ji(u
∗
1, · · · , u
∗
N) ∀u1 ∈ U1, · · · , uN ∈ UN ∀i = 1, · · · , N (2.8)
do not hold with at least one strict inequality, where Ui is agent i’s admissible strategy set.
The noninferior solution can be interpreted as a solution in which any changes made do not help
improve every agent’s performance index value.
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CHAPTER 3: OPEN-LOOP GAME STRATEGIES
In this chapter, we consider the open-loop game strategy design for both the Nash equilibrium and
noninferior solution in the formulated N-agent system. We will first introduce the existing Riccati
equation approach and then present the proposed approach based on a distributed state estimation
algorithm.
3.1 Riccati Equation Approach
To derive the open-loop game strategy, we utilize the well-known Pontryagin’s minimum principle
[71] which yields the necessary optimality conditions for both the Nash equilibrium strategy and
noninferior solution strategy. These two types of strategies are presented as follows:
Open-loop Nash Equilibrium Strategy: The open-loop Nash equilibrium under the linear quadratic
framework is well-known [7] and the result is presented as the following theorem without proof.
Theorem 3.1. For the differential game in an N-agent system defined by system dynamics in (2.2)
and performance indices in (2.5), the strategies
ui(t) = −R
−1
i (t)B
T
i (t)Pi(t)φ(t, 0)x(0) ∀i = 1, · · · , N (3.1)
form an open-loop Nash equilibrium, where matrix φ(t, 0) is the closed-loop state transition matrix
defined by φ(t, 0) = eA¯t and A¯ = A −∑Nj=1BjR−1j BTj Pj , and matrix Pi(t) is the solution to the
following coupled differential Riccati equations
P˙i + PiA+ A
TPi − Pi
N∑
j=1
BjR
−1
j B
T
j Pj + C
T
i QiCi = 0 ∀i = 1, · · · , N (3.2)
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with the boundary condition Pi(tf ) = CT (tf )FiC(tf).
Open-loop Noninferior Solution Strategy: The noninferior solution strategy is essentially de-
rived by minimizing the following convex combination of all the agents’ performance indices
J =
N∑
j=1
αjJj (3.3)
where 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 and
∑N
j=1 αj = 1. This minimization is essentially a optimal control prob-
lem with parameters α1, · · · , αN . The open-loop noninferior solution under the linear quadratic
framework was obtained in [7] and the result is presented as the following theorem without proof.
Theorem 3.2. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system dy-
namics in (2.2) and performance indices in (2.5), the strategies
ui(t) = −
1
αi
R−1i (t)B
T
i (t)P (t)φ(t, 0)x(0) ∀i = 1, · · · , N (3.4)
form an open-loop noninferior solution, where matrix φ(t, 0) is the closed-loop state transition
matrix defined by φ(t, 0) = eA¯t and A¯ = A−∑Nj=1 1αjBjR−1j BTj P , and matrix P (t) is the solution
to the following differential Riccati equation
P˙ + PA+ ATP −
N∑
j=1
1
αj
PBjR
−1
j BjP +
N∑
j=1
αjC
T
j QjCj = 0 (3.5)
with the boundary condition P (tf) =
∑N
j=1 αjC
T
j (tf )FjCj(tf).
Note that the above approaches requires to solve for the matrix Pi(t) from the coupled differential
Riccati equations in (3.1) backward in time or matrix P (t) from the differential Riccati equation in
(3.5) backward in time. After solving the differential equation (usually with the aid of computer),
24
the matrix solution will generally become a full matrix with all the entries being nonzero. There-
fore, by looking at the expression in (3.1) or (3.4), individual agents in the game needs to have the
complete knowledge of the initial state information, x(0), in order to implement their open-loop
Nash equilibrium strategies or noninferior solution strategies. In the conventional game problem,
this requirement has no problem because it is always assume that all the required information is
available for each and every player. However, if the differential game takes place in a multi-agent
system under distributed information, then agent i can acquire the information of the agent j only
if eij ∈ E and hence is not able to implement the strategy (3.1) or (3.4) derived using the Riccati
equation(s) approach.
3.2 Distributed Game Strategy Design
Realizing that the open-loop Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution expressed in (3.1) and (3.4)
are not implementable in the multi-agent system under distributed information, a new approach for
the open-loop Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution design must be proposed for the agents
such that they can carry it out to accommodate the distributed information. To achieve this, first of
all, the performance needs be well structured according to the information graph among the agents.
We define a block diagonal matrix Di ∈ RNr×Nr as follows:
Di =
∑
eij∈E
(djd
T
j )⊗ Ir ∀i = 1, · · · , N, (3.6)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product and Ir is the r× r identity matrix. The the jth diagonal block is
equal to Ir if eij ∈ E and 0 if eij /∈ E . For instance, the matricesD1, D2, D3, D4 for the information
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graph shown in Figure 2.1 are
D1 =


Ir 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


, D2 =


Ir 0 0 0
0 Ir 0 0
0 0 Ir 0
0 0 0 0


, D3 =


Ir 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 Ir 0
0 0 0 Ir


, D4 =


Ir 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 Ir


,
respectively. The product of (Diy) is a vector with the jth block entry to yj if eij ∈ E and 0 if
eij /∈ E . Therefore, we consider the structured performance index (2.5) with matrices
Fi = D
T
i F˜iDi (3.7)
and Qi = 0, which can be expressed as
Ji =
1
2
‖y(tf)‖
2
DTi F˜iDi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
‖ui(t)‖
2
Ri(t)
dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (3.8)
where matrix F˜i can be selected appropriately to achieve desired control objective of agent i as
discussed in Section 2.3. Basically, performance index (3.8) means that agent i tries to minimize
a cost term that only involves the outputs of agent j for all eij ∈ E at the terminal time while at
the same time minimizing its control effort over the entire game process. For the differential game
defined by system (2.2) and performance indices (3.8), it will turn out that the open-loop Nash
equilibrium and noninferior solution have explicit expressions and can be utilized to construct a
distributed strategy synthesis algorithm under certain condition. First of all, we define a new state
vector as
zi = Ci(t)φi(tf , t)xi(t) (3.9)
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where φi(tf , t) = eAi(tf−t). Differentiating the above equation with respect to t and recalling
system dynamics in (2.1) yields:
z˙i =Ciφ˙ixi + Ciφix˙i = B
′
i(t)ui, (3.10)
where B′i(t) = Ciφi(tf , t)Bˆi. Denoting z = [zT1 · · · zTN ]T , the system dynamics can be expressed
more compactly as follows:
z˙ =


B′1u1
.
.
.
B′NuN

 =
N∑
j=1
B˜juj (3.11)
where B˜j(t) = (dj ⊗ Ir)B′j(t) and dj is an N × 1 vector with the jth entry equal to 1 and the other
entries equal to 0. Since it is clear that z(tf ) = y(tf), performance indices in (3.8) can be also
expressed as
Ji =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
‖ui(t)‖
2
Ri(t)
dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (3.12)
where matrix Fi is as defined in (3.7).
3.2.1 Nash Strategy Design
The open-loop Nash equilibrium can be derived using Pontryagin’s minimum principle and is
presented as follows.
Theorem 3.3. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed information de-
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fined by system dynamics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9), the strategies
ui =−R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiM
−1z(0) (3.13)
for i = 1, · · · , N form an open-loop Nash equilibrium if matrix M defined by
M = INr +
N∑
j=1
SjFj, (3.14a)
Sj =
∫ tf
0
B˜j(t)R
−1
j (t)B˜
T
j (t)dt, (3.14b)
is invertible.
Proof. We define the Hamiltonian for agent i as
Hi =
1
2
‖ui‖
2
Ri
+ λTi
N∑
j=1
B˜juj
where vector λi ∈ RNr is the Lagrangian multiplier. Since the second order partial derivative of
Hi with respect to ui is equal to Ri and hence is positive define, the following conditions for ui to
minimize the performance index are necessary and sufficient
z˙ =
∂Hi
∂λi
=
N∑
j=1
B˜juj, (3.15a)
λ˙i = −
∂Hi
∂z
= 0, λi(tf) = Fiz(tf ), (3.15b)
∂Hi
∂ui
= Riui + B˜
T
i λi = 0. (3.15c)
Condition (3.15b) indicates that λi is a constant vector and hence
λi(t) = Fiz(tf ) ∀t ∈ [0, tf ]
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From (3.15c), we obtain
ui =− R
−1
i B˜
T
i λi = −R
−1
i B˜
T
i Fiz(tf ) = −R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz(tf ). (3.16)
Substituting (3.16) into (3.15a) and integrating both sides from 0 to tf yield
(
INr +
N∑
j=1
SjFj
)
z(tf ) =z(0)
Mz(tf ) =z(0) (3.17)
where matrices M and Sj are defined in (3.14). Therefore, if the matrix M is invertible, then
z(tf ) = M
−1z(0). (3.18)
Substituting (3.18) into (3.16) yields the open-loop Nash strategy (3.13).
Note that M−1 in (3.13) is generally a full matrix. Therefore, implementing open-loop Nash
strategy ui in (3.13) will still requires every agent to have the complete knowledge of the initial
state z(0) = [zT1 (0), · · · , z
T
N (0)]
T
. However, it is worthwhile noting that if we define a new vector
z˜ = [z˜T1 · · · z˜
T
N ]
T such that z˜ = M−1z(0), then the strategy ui expressed in (3.13) has an
interesting distributed property, that is, agent i is able to implement (3.13) as long as agent j
sends its the information of z˜j to agent i for all eij ∈ E because the product DiM−1z(0) = Diz˜ =∑
eij∈E
dj⊗ z˜j in (3.13) only needs the information of z˜j for all eij ∈ E . Therefore, in order for the
agents to obtain the value of z˜ in a distributed manner, the basic idea is to let the agents exchange
the estimates denoted by zf1 , · · · , z
f
N through the communication network and make these estimates
asymptotically converge to the actual value of z˜1, · · · , z˜N . Toward that end, we have the following
result.
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Theorem 3.4. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system dy-
namics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9), if
1. matrix (−M) in (3.14a) is Hurwitz (all the eigenvalues have negative real parts) and
2. agent i updates its state estimate, zfi ∈ Rr, for all i = 1, · · · , N according to
z˙fi = g
[
zi(0)− z
f
i − (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)SiD
T
i F˜iDiz
f
]
(3.19)
from any initial condition zfi (0), where g is a positive scalar and zf = [(zf1 )T · · · (zfN)T ]T ,
then
lim
t→∞
zfi (t) = (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)M
−1z(0) = z˜i(tf). (3.20)
Proof. Stacking equation (3.19) from i = 1 to i = N yields
z˙f =g
[
z(0)− zf −
N∑
j=1
SjFjz
f
]
=g
[
z(0)−Mzf
]
. (3.21)
where matrix M is defined in (3.14a). If matrix (−M) is Hurwitz, linear system (3.21) with
respect to zf is asymptotically stable starting from any initial condition zf (0) and zf asymptotically
converges to the equilibrium of the differential equation (3.21), that is,
lim
t→∞
zf (t) = M−1z(0).
Multiplying (dTi ⊗ Ir) on both sides of the above equation yields (3.20), indicating that agent i’s
state estimate, zfi (t), converges to z˜i as t goes to infinity.
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Note that to carry out the estimation law (3.19), agent i only needs to
• retain its private information: zi(0), Si, Fi,
• send its state estimate zfi to agent j if eji ∈ E , and
• receive the state estimate(s) zfj from agent j for all eij ∈ E because the product (Dizf ) in
(3.19) is a function of zfj for all eij ∈ E only.
Since it is better to make the distributed state estimation algorithm (3.19) converge fast, one can
increase the positive scalar g to achieve satisfactory convergence speed. Note that to successfully
implement the above state estimation law (3.19), a critical condition is that all the eigenvalues of
matrix M defined in (3.14a) have to have positive real parts. This condition appears to be quite
stringent, however, this condition can be satisfied in many multi-agent system applications, such
as the rendezvous problem and formation control problem. Note that one important feature of the
proposed algorithm is that to implement it, every agent does not need to know the other agents’
system dynamics, performance indices, or the overall graph connection. This fully distributed
feature of the proposed approach is preferred in many real life applications.
With this distributed state estimation law, one possible way to implement the open-loop Nash strat-
egy is to let all the agents in the system communicate for a while until a satisfactory convergent
value of the state, say z¯f , is reached before the game starts. The agents will then implement the
open-loop Nash strategy expressed in (3.13) with DiM−1z(0) replaced by Diz¯f . Such a design
approach can be regarded as an offline computation among the agents. Although the offline ap-
proach provides accurate enough open-loop Nash strategy, it may not be applicable to the situation
that requires the real-time implementation. To overcome this issue, combining the open-loop Nash
strategy expressed in (3.16) along with the state estimation algorithm (3.19), an online open-loop
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Nash strategy design algorithm is proposed as follows:.
z˙fi = g
[
zi(0)− z
f
i − (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)SiD
T
i F˜iDiz
f
]
(3.22a)
ui = −R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz
f (3.22b)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . Since differential equation (3.22a) is asymptotically stable, the strategy
(3.22b) is actually an approximate of the actual open-loop Nash strategy in the early (transient)
stage of the game and becomes sufficiently close to the actual open-loop Nash strategy thereafter.
Therefore, the inequalities (2.6) in the definition of Nash equilibrium in fact does not hold un-
der this online computing strategy and the agents can have the intend to deviate unilaterally. To
quantify the agents’ willingness to unilaterally deviate from the proposed strategy in (3.22), we
utilize the concept of ε-Nash equilibrium in Definition 2.5. In what follows, the proposed online
computing strategies in (3.22) will be shown to form an ε-Nash equilibrium and the value of ε will
be derived. First of all, we present the following lemmas:
Lemma 3.1. All the eigenvalues of matrix
Sjj = (d
T
j ⊗ Ir)SjD
T
j F˜j(dj ⊗ Ir) (3.23)
has nonnegative real parts for all j = 1, · · · , N where matrix Sj is defined in (3.14b).
Proof. Substituting (3.14b) into (3.23) yields
Sjj = (d
T
j ⊗ Ir)Sj(dj ⊗ Ir) = (d
T
j ⊗ Ir)
∫ tf
0
B˜j(t)R
−1
j (t)B˜
T
j (t)dtDTj F˜j(dj ⊗ Ik).
32
Due to the definition of Dj in (3.6) and B˜j = (dj ⊗ Ir)B′j , the above equation becomes
Sjj =
∫ tf
0
B′j(t)R
−1
j (t)(B
′
j)
T (t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
(dTj ⊗ Ir)F˜j(dj ⊗ Ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
.
Since both term a and term b are positive semi-definite, all the eigenvalues of matrix Sjj have
nonnegative real parts.
Lemma 3.2. If (−M) is Hurwitz for matrix M defined in (3.14a), supposing that matrix P is the
unique positive definite solution to the Lyapunov equation
−MTP − PM = −I, (3.24)
then for linear system
θ˙ = −gMθ (3.25)
with the initial state θ(0), the inequalities
∫ tf
0
‖θ‖22dt ≤
2γmaxV (0)
gγmin
(1− e−gγmintf ), (3.26a)∫ tf
0
‖θ‖2dt ≤
2
√
2γmaxV (0)
gγmin
(1− e−gγmintf /2). (3.26b)
hold, where ‖·‖2 stand for Euclidean norm, V (0) = 1/2θT (0)Pθ(0), γmin = 1/λmax(P ), λmax(P )
is the largest eigenvalue of matrix P , γmax = 1/λmin(P ), and λmin(P ) is the smallest eigenvalue
of matrix P .
Proof. If matrix (−M) is Hurwitz, we consider the quadratic Lyapunov function V = 1/2θTPθ
for system (3.25), where matrix P is the solution to the Lyapunov equation (3.24). The derivative
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of the Lyapunov function along the trajectory of system (3.25) is
V˙ =
1
2
θT (−gMTP − gPM)θ = −
g
2
‖θ‖22 ≤ −
g
2λmax(P )
θTPθ = −gγminV
where the last inequality is due to the property θTPθ ≤ λmax(P )‖θ‖22. The above differential
inequality yields
1
2
λmin(P )‖θ‖
2
2 ≤
1
2
θTPθ = V (t) ≤ e−gγmintV (0) =⇒ ‖θ‖22 ≤ 2γmaxe
−gγmintV (0).
Therefore, integrating the above inequality from 0 to tf yields (3.26a) and the square root of the
above inequality from 0 to tf yields (3.26b).
We now present the ε-Nash equilibrium for the proposed strategy (3.22) as the following theorem:
Theorem 3.5. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed information de-
fined by system dynamics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9), if (−M) is Hurwitz for matrix
M defined in (3.14a), then the online computing strategies described by (3.22) form an ε-Nash
equilibrium where
ε = max
i=1,··· ,N
εi (3.27)
where
εi =
2‖F˜Ri‖2γmaxV (0)
gγmin
(1− e−gγmintf ) +
8‖M˜i‖2W
2
maxγmaxV (0)
g2γ2min
(1− e−gγmintf /2)2, (3.28)
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scalars γmin, γmax, and V (0) are defined in Lemma 3.2 with θ(0) = zf (0)−M−1z(0),
F˜Ri = D
T
i F˜iDiB˜iR
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDi, (3.29a)
M˜i = MF i + tfM
T
i F˜RiMi, (3.29b)
MF i = M
T (di ⊗ Ir)(I + Sii)
−1F˜ii(I + Sii)
−1(dTi ⊗ Ir)M, (3.29c)
F˜ii = (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)F˜i(di ⊗ Ir), (3.29d)
Mi = I − (di ⊗ Ir)(I + Sii)
−1(dTi ⊗ Ir)M, (3.29e)
Wmax = max
0≤t≤tf
‖W (t)‖2, W (t) =
N∑
j=1
B˜jR
−1
j B˜
T
j D
T
j F˜jDj , (3.29f)
and matrix Sii is defined in (3.23).
Proof. First of all, if knowing every other agent will choose the online computing strategy (3.22),
the best strategy of agent i in response to these strategies is
u∗i =− R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz
∗(tf) (3.30)
which is obtained from (3.16), where z∗i is agent i’s state trajectory under the best reaction strategy
u∗i in (3.30). Denoting zj as the state trajectory of agent j (j 6= i) for all eij ∈ E under strategy
(3.22) yields
Diz
∗(tf) = (di ⊗ Ir)z
∗
i (tf ) +
∑
eij∈E,j 6=i
(dj ⊗ Ir)zj(tf).
Then, u∗i in (3.30) becomes
u∗i =− R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜i

(di ⊗ Ir)z∗i (tf ) + ∑
eij∈E,i 6=j
(dj ⊗ Ir)zj(tf)


=− R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜i [Diz(tf )− (di ⊗ Ir)∆zi(tf )] (3.31)
35
where ∆zi = zi− z∗i . We denote Ji as the performance index value of (3.8) if every agent chooses
strategy (3.22) and J∗i as the performance index value of (3.8) if agent i chooses strategy (3.31)
and every other agent chooses strategy (3.22). The difference between Ji and J∗i is
Ji − J
∗
i =
1
2
(‖Diz(tf )‖
2
F˜i
− ‖Diz
∗(tf)‖
2
F˜i
) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖ui‖
2
Ri
− ‖u∗i ‖
2
Ri
)dt
=
1
2
[Diz(tf )−Diz
∗(tf )]
T F˜i[Diz(tf ) +Diz
∗(tf )] +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(ui − u
∗
i )
T
i Ri(ui + u
∗
i )dt
=
1
2
∆zTi (tf)F˜ii∆zi(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
∆uTi Ri(∆ui + 2u
∗
i )dt (3.32)
where F˜ii is defined in (3.29d) and ∆ui = ui − u∗i . Since the dynamics of ∆zi is as follows:
∆z˙i = z˙i − z˙
∗
i = B
′
iui −B
′
iu
∗
i = B
′
i∆ui, (3.33)
integrating the above equation from 0 to tf yields
∆zi(tf ) =
∫ tf
0
B′i∆uidt
Substituting the above equation into (3.32) and recalling the expression of u∗i in (3.30) yield
Ji − J
∗
i =
1
2
∆zTi (tf)F˜ii∆zi(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
∆uTi Ri∆uidt. (3.34)
Clearly, the value of (Ji − J∗i ) shown above is always nonnegative which is as expected. To find
the value or upper bound of (Ji−J∗i ), it is necessary to find the values of ∆zi(tf ) and ∆ui. Toward
that end, first of all, solving the differential equation in (3.21) yields
zf (t) = M−1z(0) + θ(t). (3.35)
where θ(t) is defined in (3.25) with the initial state θ(0) = zf (0)−M−1z(0). The system dynamics
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(3.11) when every agent chooses strategy (3.22b) becomes
z˙ = −
N∑
j=1
B˜jR
−1
j B˜
T
j D
T
i F˜jDjz
f , −Wzf (3.36)
where W is defined in (3.29f). Substituting (3.35) into (3.36) yields
z˙ = −WM−1z(0)−Wθ. (3.37)
Since ∫ tf
0
Wdt =
N∑
j=1
SjFj
where matrices Fj and Sj are defined in (3.7) and (3.14b), integrating equation (3.37) from 0 to tf
yields
z(tf ) =
(
I −
N∑
j=1
SjFjM
−1
)
z(0)−
∫ tf
0
Wθdt. (3.38)
Recalling the definition of matrix M in (3.14a), we have
(
I +
N∑
j=1
SjFj
)
M−1 = I =⇒ M−1 = I −
N∑
j=1
SjFjM
−1.
Hence, equation (3.38) becomes
z(tf ) = M
−1z(0)−
∫ tf
0
Wθdt. (3.39)
Second, substituting u∗i in (3.31) into (3.10) yields
z˙∗i = −(d
T
i ⊗ Ir)B˜iR
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜i [Diz(tf )− (di ⊗ Ir)∆zi(tf)]
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Integrating the above equation from 0 to tf yields
z∗i (tf ) =zi(0)− (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)SiD
T
i F˜i [Dizi(tf )− (di ⊗ Ir)∆zi(tf )]
=zi(0) + Sii∆zi(tf )− (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)SiFiz(tf )
where Sii is as defined in (3.23). Therefore, substituting the above equation into the expression of
∆zi(tf) yields
∆zi(tf ) =zi(tf)− z
∗
i (tf ) = zi(tf)− zi(0)− Sii∆zi(tf) + (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)SiFiz(tf )
After some manipulations, we arrive at
(I + Sii)∆zi(tf) =(d
T
i ⊗ In)[Mz(tf )− z(0)]
As we showed in Lemma 3.1, all the eigenvalues of Sii in the right hand side of the above equation
have nonnegative real parts and hence matrix (I + Sii) is invertible. Therefore,
∆zi(tf) = (I + Sii)
−1(dTi ⊗ Ir) [Mz(tf )− z(0)] (3.40)
Therefore, substituting (3.39) into (3.40) yields the value of ∆zi(tf ) as follows:
∆zi(tf ) =− (I + Sii)
−1(dTi ⊗ Ir)M
∫ tf
0
Wθdt. (3.41)
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The value of ∆ui obtained as follows:
∆ui = ui − u
∗
i =−R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz
f +R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz
∗(tf )
=−R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz
f +R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDiz(tf )−R
−1
i B˜iD
T
i F˜i(di ⊗ Ir)∆zi(tf )
=−R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDi[z
f − z(tf )]−R
−1
i B˜iD
T
i F˜i(di ⊗ Ir)∆zi(tf ), (3.42)
Recalling (3.18) and (3.39), the value of [zf − z(tf )] in the above equation can be obtained as
zf − z(tf ) =θ +
∫ tf
0
Wθdt (3.43)
Substituting (3.41) and (3.43) into (3.42) yields
∆ui =− R
−1
i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDi
(
θ +Mi
∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)
,− R−1i B˜
T
i D
T
i F˜iDivi, (3.44)
where vi = θ +Mi
∫ tf
0
Wθdt and matrix Mi is defined in (3.29e). Given the value of ∆zi(tf ) in
(3.41) and ∆ui in (3.44), the upper bound of (Ji − J∗i ) can be derived from (3.34) as follows:
Ji − J
∗
i =
1
2
∆zTi (tf )F˜ii∆zi(tf) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
∆uTi Ri∆uidt
=
1
2
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)T
MF i
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
vTi F˜Rividt (3.45)
where matrix MF i is defined in (3.29c) and matrix F˜Ri is defined in (3.29a). Since
1
2
∫ tf
0
vTi F˜Rividt =
1
2
∫ tf
0
(
θ +Mi
∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)T
F˜Ri
(
θ +Mi
∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)
dt
≤
∫ tf
0
θT F˜Riθdt + tf
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)T
MTi F˜RiMi
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)
(3.46)
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Substituting (3.46) into (3.45) yields
Ji − J
∗
i ≤
∫ tf
0
θT F˜Riθdt+
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)T
M˜i
(∫ tf
0
Wθdt
)
≤‖F˜Ri‖2
∫ tf
0
‖θ‖22dt+ ‖M˜i‖2W 2max
(∫ tf
0
‖θ‖2dt
)2
where matrix M˜i is defined in (3.29b) and Wmax is defined in (3.29f). Recalling Lemma 3.2,
substituting inequalities in (3.26) into the above inequality yields (3.28). The maximum value in
{ε1, · · · , εN} will satisfy the inequalities (2.7). Therefore, online computing strategies (3.22) form
an ε-Nash equilibrium.
Note that as shown in (3.28), it is clear that the value of εi decreases as g becomes larger. Therefore,
we can claim that there exists a scalar g such that the online computing strategies in (3.22) forms
an ε-Nash equilibrium that can be arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium in (3.13).
3.2.2 Noninferior Strategy Design
The open-loop Noninferior solution can also be derived using Pontryagin’s minimum principle and
is presented as follows.
Theorem 3.6. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed information de-
fined by system dynamics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9), the strategies
ui =−
1
αi
R−1i B˜
T
i
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDjM
−1
p z(0) ∀i = 1, · · · , N (3.47)
form an open-loop noninferior solution where 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1 for all j = 1, · · · , N and
∑N
j=1 αj = 1
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if matrix MP defined by
MP =
(
INr +
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
αk
αj
SjD
T
k F˜kDk
)
, (3.48)
is invertible, where matrix Sj is defined in (3.14b).
Proof. Given system dynamics in (3.11) and performance indices in (5.9), to find the noninferior
solution, we define a convex combination of J1, · · · , JN as shown in (3.3), which is
J =
1
2
zT (tf )
(
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜Dj
)
z(tf ) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(
N∑
j=1
αju
T
j Rjuj
)
dt. (3.49)
We define the Hamiltonian as
H =
1
2
(
N∑
j=1
αju
T
j Rjuj
)
+ λT
N∑
j=1
B˜juj
where vector λ ∈ RNr is the Lagrangian multiplier. Since the second order partial derivative of
H with respect to u1, · · · , uN are all equal to αiRi and hence is positive define, the following
conditions for u1, · · · , uN to minimize the performance index are necessary and sufficient
z˙ =
∂H
∂λ
=
N∑
j=1
B˜juj, (3.50a)
λ˙ = −
∂H
∂z
= 0, λ(tf) =
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDjz(tf ), (3.50b)
∂H
∂ui
= αiRiui + B˜
T
i λ = 0 ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (3.50c)
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Condition (3.50b) indicates that λ is a constant vector and hence
λ(t) =
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDiz(tf ) ∀t ∈ [0, tf ]
From (3.50c), we obtain
ui =−
1
αi
R−1i B˜
T
i λ = −
1
αi
R−1i B˜
T
i
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDjz(tf ). (3.51)
Substituting (3.59) into (3.50a) and integrating both sides from 0 to tf yield
(
INr +
N∑
j=1
1
αj
Sj
N∑
k=1
αkD
T
k F˜kDk
)
z(tf ) =z(0)
MP z(tf ) =z(0) (3.52)
where matrix MP is defined in (3.48) and matrix Sj is defined in (3.14b). Therefore, if the matrix
MP is invertible, then
z(tf ) = M
−1
P z(0). (3.53)
Substituting (3.53) into (3.59) yields the open-loop Nash strategy (3.47).
Again, note that M−1P in (3.47) is generally a full matrix. Therefore, implementing open-loop
noninferior strategy ui in (3.47) will still require every agent to have complete knowledge of the
initial state of all the agents, z(0) = [zT1 (0), · · · , zTN (0)]T . However, just like the proposed open-
loop Nash strategy design approach in the previous section, we are also able to apply the same idea
to the open-loop noninferior strategy design. Toward that end, we have the following result:
Theorem 3.7. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system dy-
namics (3.11) and performance indices (5.9), if
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1. matrix (−MP ) in (3.48) is Hurwitz and
2. agent i updates the estimate of its state, zfi ∈ Rr, according to
z˙fi = g
[
zi(0)− z
f
i − (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)
1
αi
Si
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDjz
f
]
∀i = 1, · · · , N (3.54)
from any initial condition zfi (0), where g is a positive scalar and zf = [(zf1 )T · · · (zfN)T ]T ,
then
lim
t→∞
zfi (t) = (d
T
i ⊗ Ir)M
−1
p z(0). (3.55)
Proof. The proof is in the same fashion as the one for theorem 3.4. Stacking equation (3.54) from
i = 1 to i = N yields
z˙f =g
[
z(0)− zf −
N∑
j=1
1
αj
Sj
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDjz
f
]
=g
[
z(0)−MP z
f
]
. (3.56)
where matrix MP is defined in (3.48). If matrix (−MP ) is Hurwitz, linear system (3.56) with
respect to zf is asymptotically stable starting from any initial condition zf (0) and zf asymptotically
converges to the equilibrium of the differential equation (3.56), that is,
lim
t→∞
zf (t) = M−1P z(0).
Multiplying (dTi ⊗ Ir) on both sides of the above equation yields (3.55).
Note that one can increase the positive scalar g to achieve satisfactory convergence speed of the
state estimation process. Also note that it is not clear so far whether implementing (3.54) only re-
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quires each agent to have the information available to it only. In fact, there exist several conditions
on the information graph and agents’ performance indices such that the estimation law (3.54) can
be carried out in a distributed manner. These conditions are presented in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system
dynamics (3.11) and performance indices (5.9), if
1. the information graph among the agents is undirected1 and
2. matrix F˜j has the following structure
F˜j = (djd
T
j )⊗ F˜
jj
j +
∑
ejk∈E,k 6=j
[(dkd
T
k )⊗ F˜
kk
j + (djd
T
k )⊗ F˜
jk
j + (dkd
T
j )⊗ F˜
kj
j ], (3.57)
for all j = 1, · · · , N ,
then the state estimation law in (3.54) can be expressed as
z˙fi = g

zi(0)− zfi − S ′i

∑
eij∈E
F˜ iji z
f
i +
∑
eji∈E,j 6=i
αj
αi
(
F˜ ijj z
f
j + F˜
ii
j z
f
i
)

 . (3.58)
for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. For agent i, matrix Dj defined in (3.6) can be expressed as
Dj =


(did
T
i )⊗ Ir +
∑
ejk∈E,k 6=i
(dkd
T
k )⊗ Ir if eji ∈ E
∑
ejk∈E,k 6=i
(dkd
T
k )⊗ Ir if eji /∈ E
1A graph is undirected if every edge is bidirectional, that is, edges eij ∈ E indicates eji ∈ E .
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for all j = 1, · · · , N and hence recalling (3.14b), we have
Si
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDj =(di ⊗ Ir)S
′
i
∑
eji∈E
αj(d
T
i ⊗ Ir)F˜jDj , (3.59)
where S ′i =
∫ tf
0
B′iR
−1(B′i)
Tdt. Substituting (3.57) into (3.59) yields
Si
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDj =(di ⊗ Ir)S
′
i
∑
eji∈E
αj(d
T
i ⊗ Ir)
{
(dkd
T
k )⊗ F˜
jj
j
+
∑
ejk∈E,k 6=j
[(dkd
T
k )⊗ F˜
kk
j + (djd
T
k )⊗ F˜
jk
j + (dkd
T
j )⊗ F˜
kj
j ]
}
Dj
After some mathematical manipulations to the above equation and using the property of a undi-
rected graph (bidirectional edges), we arrive at
Si
N∑
j=1
αjD
T
j F˜jDj = (di ⊗ Ir)S
′
i

αi ∑
eij∈E
(dTj ⊗ F˜
ij
i ) +
∑
eij∈E,j 6=i
αj(d
T
j ⊗ F˜
ij
j + d
T
i ⊗ F˜
ii
j )


(3.60)
Therefore, substituting (3.60) into (3.54) yields (3.58)
It is clear that under the conditions in Corollary 3.1, the state estimation law expressed in (3.57)
for agent i only requires it to receive the state estimate zfj from agent j for all eij ∈ E . Therefore,
this estimation law can be carried out by individual agents in a distributed manner. Note that the
two conditions in Corollary 3.1 can be successfully satisfied for many applications of the multi-
agent system and this will be illustrated in an example later in Chapter 5. Compared with the state
estimation law for the Nash equilibrium in the previous section (which does not require each agent
to have the information of the system dynamics and performance indices of other agents and the
overall information topology), the proposed state estimation law for the noninferior solution does
not require each agent to know the overall information topology either, however, it requires each
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agent to have the information of the convex combination parameters α1, · · · , αN (which need be
assigned to individual agents due to the nature of the cooperative game) and the coefficients F˜ ijj
and F˜ iij in the performance index of agent j for eij∈E .
Similar to the open-loop Nash strategy design algorithm, to implement the open-loop noninferior
strategy, the state estimation law (3.58) can be carried out offline first until a certain convergent
value of the state is achieved. Moreover, an online open-loop noninferior strategy design algorithm
based on (3.59) can be proposed similar to (3.22) as follows:.
z˙fi = g

zi(0)− zfi − S ′i

∑
eij∈E
F˜ iji z
f
i +
∑
eji∈E,j 6=i
αj
αi
(
F˜ ijj z
f
j + F˜
ii
j z
f
i
)

 (3.61a)
ui = −R
−1
i (B
′
i)
T

∑
eij∈E
(F˜ iji z
f
i ) +
∑
eij∈E,j 6=i
αj
αi
(F˜ ijj z
f
j + F˜
ii
j z
f
i )

 (3.61b)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . Although the above online computing algorithm is approximate to the actual
noninferior strategy, it is obvious that the convergence speed of (3.61a) can be made arbitrarily
fast by adjusting the value of g and hence the strategy in (3.61) can be arbitrarily close to the
noninferior strategy by choosing a proper value of g.
3.3 Extensions
In the previous sections, we have proposed the distributed open-loop Nash strategy design approach
and distributed open-loop noninferior strategy design approach for differential games in the multi-
agent system under distributed information. Several extensions are presented as follows:
1. Note that these strategies are developed based on performance indices (5.9) which do not
contain the integral costs on the quadratic form of the state, while the general performance
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indices in (2.5) contain such costs. The advantage of including such integral costs on the state
is to improve the transient behavior of the state trajectory under the resulting Nash strategies
or noninferior strategies. However, in order to develop a distributed game design approach
based on the novel state estimation law, it is required that such integral costs on the state to
be eliminated. Fortunately, for most of the applications in the multi-agent systems, such as
rendezvous, formation control, flocking, etc., a satisfactory performance on the terminal state
is much more important than the performance on the transient state. Therefore, adopting the
performance indices (5.9) is a reasonable choice in most of the applications and hence the
proposed approaches are applicable. Alternatively, one possible approach to improve the
transient behavior of the state is dividing the entire game horizon [0, tf ] into l intervals, that
is,
[0, tf ] = [0, t1] ∪ (t1, t2] ∪ · · · ∪ (tl−2, tl−1] ∪ (tl−1, tf ].
The proposed distributed game strategy design approaches can then be carried out by the
agents at each and every time interval based on the performance indices (5.9) with the entire
time horizon [0, tf ] replaced by the above smaller time intervals and the terminal state z(tf )
replaced by z(i) for all i = t1, · · · , tl−1, tf . As an approximate of the original problem,
this alternative game problem with several smaller horizons will not render game strate-
gies that are exactly the same as the ones derived based on the original performance in-
dices. However, since this approach takes several sampled states at the transient time instants
t1, t2, · · · , tl−2, tl−1 into account, the resulting state trajectory will have better transient per-
formance than the one over only one horizon [0, tf ].
2. For the differential game over the infinite time horizon, that is, tf =∞, in order to implement
the proposed open-loop distributed strategy design approach, one possible approach is to
combine this approach with the receding horizon control technique [72] which has been
widely used and given very good results in practice applications. Specifically, in this case,
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we will consider the following receding horizon performance indices instead of (5.9)
Ji =
1
2
‖z(τ + tf )‖
2
Fi
+
1
2
∫ τ+tf
τ
‖ui(t)‖
2
Ri(t)
dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (3.62)
The mechanism of implementing the receding horizon control is shown in Figure. 3.1.
tf
τ1 τ2  
τ1+tf  … …
t
tf
τ2+tf  
Figure 3.1: Receding horizon control mechanism
Specifically, at time τ = τ1, the Nash equilibrium or noninferior solution of the differential
game with performance indices (3.62) is solved for the time interval [τ1, τ1+ tf ]. The agents
will implement the corresponding Nash strategies or noninferior strategies from τ1 to τ2
where τ2 ≤ τ1+ tf . The Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution will be recalculated from
τ2 to τ2 + tf and the agent will implement the corresponding strategies from τ2 to τ3. This
procedures will be repeated as the game proceeds. We should point out that since the game
is over the infinite time horizon, the stability of the multi-agent system is fairly important,
however, this issue with the receding horizon control technique is largely open and still under
investigation.
3. As we know, the feedback game strategy is preferred than the open-loop one in many real life
applications because the feedback strategies can react to the instantaneous disturbance in the
states. A practical way to convert the proposed open-loop design approach into a feedback-
like type is to utilize the sampled-Nash approach [73]. Toward that end, we consider the
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following performance indices instead of (5.9):
Ji =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fi
+
1
2
∫ tf
tk
‖ui(t)‖
2
Ri(t)
dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N, t = 1, · · · , l. (3.63)
where 0 = t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tl < tf . Combining the distributed online computing Nash strat-
egy in (3.22), the sampled distributed open-loop Nash strategy design algorithm is proposed
as follows.
Algorithm 3.1. At t = tk for all j = 1, · · · , l,
1. Agents measure and calculate z1(tk), · · · , zN (tk).
2. Agent implement (3.22) (for Nash strategy) or (3.61) (for noninferior strategy) with
zi(0) replaced by zi(tk) for i = 1, · · · , N , respectively.
3. Once t = tk+1 arrives, the agents repeat the step 1 and 2 by letting tk → tk+1.
Clearly, since the agents measure the states multiple times during the process and will hence
be more aware of the unexpected change in the system.
In this chapter, we considered the open-loop game strategy design approach in the multi-agent
system under distributed information structure. The basic idea of the proposed approach is to let the
agents in the system exchange certain information among themselves according to the information
graph such that their strategies asymptotically converge to the Nash or noninferior strategies that
can only be implemented under global information originally. This approach can be applied to
most of the applications in multi-agent systems and can also be extended to the differential games
over the infinite time horizon and differential games under feedback information structure.
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CHAPTER 4: FEEDBACK GAME STRATEGIES
In this chapter, we consider the game strategy design under distributed feedback information struc-
ture. The Riccati equation approach and the conventional optimal output feedback design approach
are introduced first. A novel distributed game strategy design approach is then proposed based on
the concept of best achievable performance indices.
4.1 Riccati Equation Approach
Feedback Nash Equilibrium Strategy: The feedback Nash equilibrium can be obtained by either
using the Pontryagin’s minimum principle or solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differ-
ential equations. The well-known feedback linear quadratic Nash equilibrium [7] is presented as
the following theorem without proof.
Theorem 4.1. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system dy-
namics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies
ui = −R
−1
i (t)B
T
i (t)Pi(t)x(t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.1)
form a feedback Nash equilibrium, where matrix Pi(t) is the solution to the following coupled
differential Riccati equations
P˙i + PiBiR
−1
i B
T
i Pi + PiA¯ + A¯
TPi + C
T
i QiCi = 0 ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.2)
with the boundary condition Pi(tf ) = CTi (tf )FiCi(tf) and A¯ = A−
∑N
j=1BjR
−1
j B
T
j Pj .
It is clear that since the coupled differential Riccati equation for the open-loop Nash equilibrium
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in (3.2) and the ones for the feedback Nash equilibrium in (4.2) are different, the open-loop Nash
strategy in (3.1) and feedback one in (4.1) are completely different.
Feedback Noninferior Solution Strategy: Since the noninferior solution is derived by solving
the linear quadratic optimal control problem with respect to the convex combination of the perfor-
mance indices in (3.3), the noninferior solution under the feedback information structure will turn
out to be in the same as (3.4) with the product of [φ(t, 0)x(0)] replaced with x(t). We present the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. For the differential game in an N-agent system environment defined by system dy-
namics in (2.2) and performance indices in (2.5), the strategies
ui(t) = −
1
αi
R−1i (t)B
T
i (t)P (t)x(t) ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.3)
form a feedback noninferior solution, where matrix P (t) is the solution to the differential Riccati
equation (3.5) with the boundary condition P (tf) =
∑N
j=1 αjC
T
j (tf)FjCj(tf ).
To derive the feedback Nash equilibrium or feedback noninferior solution, one has to solve the
differential Riccati equations (4.2) or differential Riccati equation (3.5) backward in time. Unfor-
tunately, like the open-loop Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution, the solution will generally
become a full matrix. Therefore, there is generally no way for the agents in the system to imple-
ment the feedback Nash strategy or noninferior strategy without the complete information of the
state information, x(t), at every instant of time t. To overcome this issue, we introduce an existing
distributed game strategy design approach based on the optimal output feedback control in the next
section.
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4.2 Optimal Output Feedback Approach
In this section, we consider the differential game in the N-agent system under distributed feedback
information structure. In order to conform to the underlying information graph constraint, the
agents’ linear structured strategies are in the following form:
usi =
∑
eij∈E
Kijyj , K
s
iDiy = K
s
iDiCx ∀i = 1, · · · , N,
where the superscript s in usi means that the strategy is structured, Ksi = [Ksi1 · · · KsiN ] ∈ Rmi×Nr,
and matrix Di is defined in (3.6). The structure of usi indicates that the strategy of each agent can
only be a feedback of the output information that is available to it only according to the information
graph. Denoting Cˆi = DiC, the structured strategies are expressed as
usi = K
s
i Cˆix ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (4.4)
which are apparently in the output feedback form. The basic idea of applying the optimal out-
put feedback approach [54] to the game strategy design is to parameterizing matrix Ksi in (4.4)
and derive the Nash equilibrium or noninferior solution directly with respect to this variables
Ks1 , · · · , K
s
N . In what follows, we present the distributed Nash strategy and noninferior strategy
design using the optimal output feedback approach.
4.2.1 Nash Strategy Design
With parameterized Ks1 , · · · , KsN in (4.4), the Nash equilibrium is presented as the following the-
orem based on the optimal output feedback approach.
Theorem 4.3. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback infor-
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mation structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies in
(4.4) form a feedback Nash equilibrium if the following equations holds:
x˙ = A¯x, (4.5a)
A¯ =
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
, (4.5b)
P˙i + PiA¯+ A¯
TPi + C
TQiC + Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi = 0 (4.5c)
Pi(tf) = C
T
i FiC (4.5d)
RiK
s
i Cˆixix
T
i Cˆ
T
i +B
T
i Pixx
T CˆTi = 0, (4.5e)
hold for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. Substituting structured strategies (4.4) into performance indices (2.5) yields
Ji =
1
2
‖y(tf)‖
2
Fi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
[‖y‖2Qi + ‖K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
]dt. (4.6)
The Hamiltonian is defined as
Hi =
1
2
‖x‖2CTQiC +
1
2
‖Ksi Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+ λTi
(
A +
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
x,
where vector λi is the Lagrangian multiplier. According to the Pontryagin’s minimum principle,
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the necessary optimality conditions are
x˙ =
∂Hi
∂λi
=
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
x, (4.7a)
λ˙i = −
∂Hi
∂x
= −CTQiCx− Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆix−
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)T
λi, (4.7b)
λi(tf ) = C
T
i FiCix(tf ), (4.7c)
∂Hi
∂Ksi
= RiK
s
i Cˆixx
T CˆTi +B
T
i λix
T CˆTi = 0. (4.7d)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . Letting λi = Pix and substituting it into the above equations yields equations
(4.5).
Obviously, if matrix (CˆixixTi CˆTi ) is invertible, then the optimal K can be obtained directly from
condition (4.7d) as
Ksi = −R
−1
i B
T
i λix
T CˆTi (Cˆixix
T
i Cˆ
T
i )
−1. (4.8)
Substituting (4.8) into (4.7a) and (4.7b) yields a highly nonlinear two-point boundary value prob-
lem, which is difficult to solve. Moreover, matrix (CixixTi CTi ) is generally not invertible. There-
fore, in order to solve for Ks1 , · · · , KsN , a gradient based iterative algorithm is proposed as follows.
Algorithm 4.1.
1. Choose any time-varying feedback gains Ks01 (t), · · · , Ks0N (t) for t ∈ [0, tf ] as the initial
guessing.
2. At step k, substitute Ksi (t) = Kski (t) for all i = 1, · · · , N into equations (4.5a) and (4.5c)
and solve for x(t) and P1(t), · · · , PN(t) for t ∈ [0, tf ].
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3. If
max
0≤t≤tf
‖(RiK
sk
i Cˆi +B
T
i Pi)xx
T CˆTi ‖2
is less than a stopping criteria, then Ksk1 (t), · · · , KskN (t) are the solutions. Otherwise, go to
step 4.
4. Update Kski (t) according to
K
s(k+1)
i (t) = K
sk
i (t)− ǫi
∂Hi
∂Ksi
(Kski ) ∀i = 1, · · · , N, (4.9)
where ǫi is the step size and ∂Hi∂Ks
i
(Kski ) is defined in (4.7d) with Ksi replaced with Kski . Set
k → k + 1 and go to step 2.
4.2.2 Noninferior Strategy Design
With parameterized Ks1, · · · , KsN in (4.4), the noninferior solution is presented as the following
theorem based on the optimal output feedback approach.
Theorem 4.4. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback infor-
mation structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies in
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(4.4) form a feedback noninferior solution if the following equations holds:
x˙ = A¯x, (4.10a)
A¯ =
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
, (4.10b)
P˙i + PiA¯+ A¯
TPi +
N∑
j=1
αj [C
TQjC + Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi] = 0 (4.10c)
Pi(tf ) = C
T
i FiC (4.10d)
αiRiK
s
i Cˆixx
T CˆTi + B
T
i λx
T CˆTi = 0, (4.10e)
hold for all i = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. Substituting structured strategies (4.4) into performance indices (2.5), the convex combina-
tion of the agents’ performance indices becomes
J =
1
2
N∑
j=1
αj‖y(tf)‖
2
Fj
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
αj [‖y‖
2
Qj
+ ‖Ksj Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
]dt. (4.11)
The Hamiltonian is defined as
H =
1
2
N∑
j=1
αj(‖x‖
2
CTQjC
+ ‖Ksj Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
) + λT
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
x,
where vector λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. According to the Pontryagin’s minimum principle,
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the necessary optimality conditions are
x˙ =
∂H
∂λ
=
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
x, (4.12a)
λ˙ = −
∂H
∂x
= −
N∑
j=1
αj[C
TQjC + Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi]x−
(
A +
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)T
λ, (4.12b)
λ(tf) =
N∑
j=1
αjC
T
j FjCjx(tf ), (4.12c)
∂H
∂Ksi
= αiRiK
s
i Cˆixx
T CˆTi +B
T
i λx
T CˆTi = 0 (4.12d)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . Letting λ = Px and substituting it into the above equations yields equations
(4.10).
Therefore, a gradient based iterative algorithm for deriving Ks1 , · · · , KsN that satisfy the conditions
in (4.10) can be proposed in the same fashion as Algorithm 4.1.
There are several issues regarding the optimal output feedback based game strategy design ap-
proach, which are illustrated as follows:
1. It is important to point out that using the optimal output feedback design approach, the de-
rived feedback gains Ks1 , · · · , KsN for both the Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution
will depend upon the state, x(t), as shown in equation (4.5e) and equation (4.10e). More-
over, it is equivalent to say that these feedback gains in fact depend upon the initial state,
x(0). Therefore, different sets of feedback matrices have to be derived given different initial
states of the system. One way to overcome the initial state dependence is assuming that the
initial state, x0, is a random variable with certain probabilistic distribution [54]. Under this
assumption, the agents will try to minimize the expected value of performance indices in
(2.5). The initial state dependence is hence eliminated because the resulting feedback matri-
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ces are only dependent on the covariance of the random initial state, which is assumed to be
a given value.
2. For the differential game in a multi-agent system environment, since every agent’s strategy
has influence on other agents’ performance indices values, the structured strategies defined
in (4.4) with the feedback gains Ks1 , · · · , KsN need to be simultaneously parameterized and
optimized with respect to the performance indices in order to obtain the distributed Nash
equilibrium and noninferior solution. In other words, the optimal output feedback based
approach requires all the agents to be able to choose the feedback gains freely. However, if
there exists a certain constraint for the agent on its choice of the feedback matrix, then there
is no way to apply the game strategy to each and every agent derived using optimal output
feedback approach.
Realizing the existing issues in the optimal output feedback based approach, we propose a novel
design approach for both Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution under distributed feedback
information in the following section.
4.3 Best Achievable Performance Indices Approach
In this section, we present the distributed game strategy design based on a novel concept of best
achievable performance indices. As shown in Section 4.1, with the structure constraints imposed
on the feedback gain matrices, it is generally not possible for the agent’s strategies form a Nash
equilibrium or noninferior solution with respect to the original performance indices using the Ric-
cati equation approach. However, in real life applications, the performance indices as a design
criteria can usually be adjusted according to the real operation condition or situation. This in-
spires us to consider the game strategy design in a reverse manner. The basic idea of the approach
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proposed in this section is as follows: For any structured strategies of the agents that conform to
the information graph constraint, based on the inverse optimality, there exist a set of performance
indices for the agents such that their structured strategies form a Nash equilibrium or noninferior
solution. Among all the possible sets of performance indices, we find one set that is closest to the
original set of indices. Therefore, the designed Nash equilibrium or noninferior solution is chosen
to be the one corresponding to the closest set of performance indices. In what follows, we present
the Nash strategy and noninferior strategy design approach based on the proposed concept of the
best achievable performance index.
4.3.1 Nash Strategy Design
First of all, all the possible sets of performance indices with respect to which the structured strate-
gies us1, · · · , usN described in (4.4) form a Nash equilibrium are presented as the following theorem
based on inverse optimality.
Theorem 4.5. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback informa-
tion structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies (4.4)
form a Nash equilibrium with respect to the following performance indices:
Jsi =
1
2
‖x(tf )‖
2
CTi FiCi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖x‖2Qsi + x
TΓTi ui + u
T
i Γix+ ‖ui‖
2
Ri
)dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.13)
where
Qsi = −A
TPi − P˙i − PiA + Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi),
(4.14a)
Γi(Ki) = −RiKiCˆi − B
T
i Pi, (4.14b)
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and Pi is any symmetric differentiable matrix with terminal condition Pi(tf) = CTi (tf )FiCi(tf ).
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function Vi = 1/2xTPix for agent i where matrix Pi is symmetric,
differentiable, and satisfies the terminal condition Pi(tf ) = CTi (tf)FiCi(tf ). The derivative of Vi
along the trajectory of system (2.2) is
V˙i =
1
2
(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+
1
2
xT P˙ix+
1
2
xTPi(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj). (4.15)
Integrating the above equation from 0 to tf yields
Vi(tf ) =Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+ x
T P˙ix+ x
TPi(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)]dt
=Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+ x
T P˙ix+ x
TPi(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
+ ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
− ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xT (PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi)x
−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xT (PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi)x]dt,
=Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
{−‖x‖2Qsi − x
TΓTi ui − u
T
i Γix− ‖ui‖
2
Ri
+ ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
[(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)
TBTj Pix+ x
TPiBj(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)]}dt,
where matrices Qsi and Γi are defined in (4.14). Hence, recalling the definition of the performance
index in (4.13) and Pi(tf) = CTi (tf )FiCi(tf ), one can obtain
Jsi =Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
[(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)
TBTj Pix+ x
TPiBj(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)]dt. (4.16)
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Since matrix Ri is positive definite, it is clear that performance index Jsi in (4.16) reaches its
minimum when usi = Ksi Cˆix and usj = Ksj Cˆjx for j 6= i. Since the above analysis holds for
all i = 1, · · · , N , the inequality in (2.6) with Ji replaced by Jsi holds if u∗i = KiCˆix for all
i = 1, · · · , N . Therefore, structured strategies (4.4) form a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.5 provides all the possible sets of performance indices (parameterized by feedback
gain Ks1 , · · · , KsN and P1, · · · , PN ) with respect to which the structured strategies us1, · · · , usN
expressed in (4.4) form a Nash equilibrium. For the convenience of the following analysis, we
assume that matrices P1, · · · , PN are chosen to be the solutions to the coupled differential Riccati
equations in (4.2). Comparing the set of performance indices in (4.13) with the set of original
performance indices in (2.5), the differences between them are the values of matrices Qsi and
Γi for all i = 1, · · · , N . If Qsi = CTi QiCi and Γ = 0, then Jsi becomes identical to Ji and
structured strategy us1, · · · , usN form a Nash equilibrium with respect to the original performance
indices. However, it is generally not possible to find proper values of Ks1 , · · · , KsN that achieve
this. Therefore, one way is to find a set of performance indices among all possible performance
indices in (4.13) which is closest to the ones in (2.5), that is, to make Qsi as close to (CTi QiCi) as
possible and make Γ as close to 0 as possible. We call such set of performance index (closest to the
original indices) the best achievable performance indices, which is defined formally as follows.
Definition 4.1. Given the set of performance indices in (4.13) and the set of original performance
indices in (2.5), if
∫ tf
0
‖Qsi − C
T
i QiCi‖
2
fdt and
∫ tf
0
‖Γi‖
2
fdt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.17)
are simultaneously minimized by feedback matrices Ksi (t) = Ks∗i (t) for all i = 1, · · · , N where
‖ · ‖f is the Frobenius norm, then the set of performance index Js∗1 , · · · , Js∗N corresponding to
Ks∗1 (t), · · · , K
s∗
N (t) among all the sets of performance indices in (4.13) are called the best achiev-
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able performance indices.
The concept of best achievable performance indices can be interpreted as a set of performance
indices that is in the class of performance indices described by (4.13) while is also closest to the
original indices (2.5) in terms of the Frobenius norm of the difference between the performance
index coefficient matrices. Note that if matrix Ci is invertible, then both ‖Qsi − CTi QiCi‖2f and
‖Γi‖
2
f can achieve the minimum value, zero, under the feedback matrix Ks∗i = −R−1i BTPiCˆ−1i .
Substituting this feedback matrix into (4.14a) yields the differential Riccati equations (4.2). As
such, the result reduces to the Nash equilibrium of the linear quadratic differential game. How-
ever, if matrix Cˆ is not invertible, finding Ksi = Ks∗i for all i = 1, · · · , N to minimize the terms
in (4.17) simultaneously is quite difficult. Therefore, in order to find matrices Ks∗1 (t), · · · , Ks∗N (t)
corresponding to the best achievable performance indices, we need to solve a multi-objective op-
timization problem of minimizing
∫ tf
0
‖Qsi − C
T
i QiCi‖
2
fdt and
∫ tf
0
‖Γi‖
2
fdt for all i = 1, · · · , N
simultaneously. One way to accomplish this is to minimize a convex combination of these terms
as follows.
φ(Ks1 , · · · , K
s
N) =
∫ tf
0
Hdt, (4.18)
where
H =
N∑
j=1
(βj1‖Q
s
j − C
T
j QjCj‖
2
f + βj2‖Γj‖
2
f) (4.19)
where 0 ≤ βj1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ βj2 ≤ 1, and
∑N
j=1(βj1 + βj2) = 1. The minimization problem reduces
to finding matrices Ks∗1 (t), · · · , Ks∗N (t) such that
φ(Ks∗1 (t), · · · , K
s∗
N (t)) ≤ φ(K
s
1(t), · · · , K
s
N(t)) ∀K
s
1(t), · · · , K
s
N(t). (4.20)
This minimization problem is generally quite difficult to solve analytically. A possible numerical
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approach is using gradient based iterative algorithms [74]. Since these algorithms will require an
expression for the gradient of H(t) with respect to Ks1(t), · · · , KsN(t). Recalling the property of
the Frobenius norm ‖S‖2f = Tr(STS) where Tr(·) is the matrix trace operation, equation (4.19)
becomes
Hi =
N∑
j=1
{βj1Tr[(Qsj − C
T
j QjCj)
2] + βj2}Tr(ΓjΓTj ).
Hence, the partial derivatives of H with respect to Ks1 , · · · , KsN are
∇KsiH =4βi1RiK
s
i Cˆi(Q
s
i − C
T
i QiCi)Cˆ
T
i
+ 4
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
βj1[B
T
i Pj(Q
s
j − C
T
j QjCj)Cˆ
T
i ] + 2βj2RiΓiCˆ
T
i ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (4.21)
The following gradient based iterative algorithm is proposed:
Algorithm 4.2.
1. Choose Ks01 (t), · · · , Ks0N (t) for t ∈ [0, tf ] as the initial guessing.
2. If
max
0≤t≤tf ,i=1,··· ,N
‖∇KsiH(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N )‖2
is less than a stopping criteria where∇KsiH(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N ) is defined in (4.21) withKsi (t) =
Kski (t) for all i = 1, · · · , N , then Ksk1 (t), · · · , KskN (t) are the solutions. Otherwise, go to
step 3.
3. Update Ksk1 (t), · · · , KskN (t) according to
K
s(k+1)
i (t) = K
sk
i (t)− ǫi∇KsiH(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N ) ∀i = 1, · · · , N
63
where ǫi is the step size. Set k → k + 1 and go to step 2.
Note that by varying the coefficient β11, · · · , βN1 and β12, · · · , βN2, a noninferior set of the solu-
tions can be generated. An appropriate choice of these coefficients can be made to place a desired
emphasis on minimizing each and every term in (4.17).
4.3.2 Noninferior Strategy Design
The same idea of the Nash strategy design can be also applied to the noninferior strategy de-
sign. First of all, all the possible sets of performance indices with respect to which the structured
strategies us1, · · · , usN described in (4.4) form a noninferior solution are presented as the following
theorem based on inverse optimality.
Theorem 4.6. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback infor-
mation structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies in
(4.4) form a noninferior solution with respect to the following performance indices
Jsi =
1
2
‖x(tf )‖
2
CTi FiCi
+
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖x‖2Qsi + x
TΓTi ui + u
T
i Γix+ ‖ui‖
2
Ri
)dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.22)
where
Qsi = −A
TP − P˙ − PA+ CˆTi (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi, (4.23a)
Γi(K
s
i ) = −RiK
s
i Cˆi −
1
αi
BTi P, (4.23b)
and P is any symmetric differentiable matrix with P (tf) =
∑N
j=1 αjC
T
j (tf )FjCj(tf) and 0 ≤
αi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, · · · , N and
∑N
j=1 αj = 1.
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Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function V = 1/2xTPx. The derivative of V along the trajectory
of system (2.2) is the same as (4.15). Integrating (4.15) from 0 to tf yields
V (tf) =V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPx+ xT P˙ x
+ xTP (Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)]dt
1
2
xT (tf )
(
N∑
j=1
αjC
T
j FjCj
)
x(tf) =V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPx+ xT P˙ x
+ xTP (Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
+
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
−
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
]dt,
=V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
αj[−‖x‖
2
Qsj
− xTΓTj uj − u
T
j Γjx
− ‖uj‖
2
Rj
+ ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆixi‖
2
Rj
]dt,
where matrices Qsi and Γi are defined in (4.23). Hence, denoting that Js =
∑N
j=1 J
s
j where Jsj is
defined in (4.22), we have
Js = V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
dt.
Since αj ≥ 0 and matrix Rj is positive definite for all j = 1, · · · , N , it is clear from the above
equation that usj = Ksj Cˆjx for all j = 1, · · · , N are the optimal strategies and hence form a
noninferior solution for any given α1, · · · , αN .
Note that only if the parameters α1, · · · , αN are given, the expression of performance indices
Js1 , · · · , J
s
N in (4.22) can be obtained for any structured strategies us1, · · · , usN in (4.4). For the
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convenience of the following analysis, we assume that the value of matrix P are chosen to be
the solution to the differential Riccati equation in (3.5). The definition of the best performance
indices in this case is in fact the same as Definition 4.1 with matrices Qsi and Γsi replaced by the
ones in (4.23). Similar to the Nash strategy design, to find matrices Ks∗1 , · · · , Ks∗N corresponding
to the best achievable performance indices, we solve a minimization problem with respect to the
convex combination in (4.18). In this case, the partial derivatives of H with respect to Ks1 , · · · , KsN
become
∇KsiH =4βi1RiK
s
i Cˆi(Q
s
i − C
T
i QiCi)Cˆ
T
i + 2βj2RiΓiCˆ
T
i ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.24)
where matrices Qsi and Γi are defined in (4.23). Therefore, with the expression of the gradient
in (4.24), the same gradient based iterative algorithm as Algorithm 4.2 can be utilized to derive
Ks∗1 , · · · , K
s∗
N corresponding to the best achievable performance indices algorithm for any given
set of parameters α1, · · · , αN . Again, by varying the coefficient β11, · · · , βN1 and β12, · · · , βN2, a
noninferior set of the solutions can be generated. An appropriate choice of these coefficients can
be made to place a desired emphasis on minimizing each and every term in (4.17).
With the best achievable performance indices approach proposed, in what follows, we point out
several features of this approach and how this approach overcomes the issues in the previous opti-
mal output feedback based approach.
1. Matrices Ks∗1 , · · · , Ks∗N derived using the best achievable performance indices approach for
both the Nash equilibrium and noninferior solution are independent on the initial state.
2. The optimal output feedback approach requires every agent to be able to choose the feedback
gain matrices freely and optimize the parameterized feedback gains Ks1 , · · · , KsN simultane-
ously. While using the best performance indices approach, no such requirement is needed.
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Specifically, if the structured strategies for one or more agents are fixed, then the best achiev-
able performance indices can still be applicable in the sense that the rest agents can optimize
their feedback matrices such that the set of performance indices with respect to which all the
agents’ strategies (the optimized strategies and the fixed strategies) form a Nash equilibrium
or noninferior solution are closest to the original set of performance indices.
4.4 Feedback Game Strategy Design over the Infinite Time Horizon
In this section, we consider the feedback Nash strategy and noninferior strategy design for the dif-
ferential games over the infinite time horizon in the multi-agent systems under distributed feedback
information structure.
For the game over the infinite time horizon, we assume that dynamics (2.1) for every agent is
time-invariant, stablizable, and detectable. The performance indices are given by
Ji =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(‖y‖2Qi + ‖ui‖
2
Ri
)dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.25)
where matrix Qi is time-invariant and positive semi-definite (with exceptions in cases such as the
pursuit-evasion games) and matrix Ri is time-variant and positive definite for all i = 1, · · · , N . If
the strategies of all the agents are constrained to be (4.4), then the following result similar result to
Theorem 4.5 is obtained.
Theorem 4.7. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback infor-
mation structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (4.25), the strategies
in (4.4) with form a Nash equilibrium with respect to the following performance indices:
Jsi =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(‖x‖2Qsi + x
TΓTi ui + u
T
i Γix+ ‖ui‖
2
Ri
)dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.26)
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if the closed-loop system x˙ = (A+∑Nj=1BjKsj Cˆj)x is asymptotically stabilize, where
Qsi = −A
TPi − PiA + Cˆ
T
i (K
s
i )
TRiKiCˆi +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
(PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi), (4.27a)
Γi = −RiK
s
i Cˆi −B
T
i Pi, (4.27b)
and matrix Pi is symmetric.
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function Vi = 1/2xTPix for agent i. Its derivative along the trajec-
tory of (2.1) is
V˙i =
1
2
(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+
1
2
xTPi(Axi +
N∑
j=1
Bjuj). (4.28)
If the closed-loop system is asymptotically stable, integrating (4.28) from 0 to ∞ yields
Vi(∞) = 0 =Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ ∞
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+ x
TPi(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)]dt
=Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ ∞
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPix+ x
TPi(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
+ ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
− ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xT (PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi)x
−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
xT (PiBjK
s
j Cˆj + Cˆ
T
j (K
s
j )
TBTj Pi)x]dt,
=Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ ∞
0
{−‖x‖2Qsi − x
TΓTi ui − u
T
i Γix− ‖ui‖
2
Ri
+ ‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
[(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)
TBTj Pix+ x
TPiBj(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)]}dt,
where matrices Qsi and Γi are defined in (4.27). Hence, recalling the definition of the performance
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index in (4.26), we have
Jsi =Vi(0) +
1
2
∫ ∞
0
‖ui −K
s
i Cˆix‖
2
Ri
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
[(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)
TBTj Pix+ x
TPiBj(uj −K
s
j Cˆjx)]dt.. (4.29)
Since matrix Ri is positive definite, the inequalities in (2.6) hold true with Ji replaced by Jsi
if u∗i = Ksi Cˆix for i = 1, · · · , N . Therefore, the structured strategies in (4.4) form a Nash
equilibrium.
For the convenience of the following derivation, the values of matrices P1, · · · , PN are chosen to
be the solutions to the algebraic version of the coupled differential Riccati equations in (4.2) by
setting P˙1 = · · · = P˙N = 0. Therefore, with all the possible performance indices parameterized
in (4.26), the definition of best achievable performance indices over the infinite time horizon is as
follows:
Definition 4.2. Given the set of performance indices in (4.26) and the set of original performance
indices in (4.25) over the infinite time horizon, if
‖Qsi − C
T
i QiCi‖
2
f and ‖Γi‖2f ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.30)
are simultaneously minimized by feedback matrices Ksi (t) = Ks∗i (t) for all i = 1, · · · , N where
‖ · ‖f is the Frobenius norm, then the set of performance index Js∗1 , · · · , Js∗N corresponding to
Ks∗1 (t), · · · , K
s∗
N (t) among all the sets of performance indices in (4.26) are called the best achiev-
able performance indices.
Note that if matrix Cˆi is invertible, both ‖Qsi − CTi QiCi‖2f and ‖Γi‖2f can achieve the minimum
value, 0, under the feedback matrix Ksi = −R−1i BTPiCˆ−1i . Substituting this feedback matrix
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into (4.27a) yields the algebraic version of differential Riccati equations (4.2). In the case that
matrix Cˆi is not invertible, we need to utilize a numerical algorithm to find feedback matrices
Ks∗1 , · · · , K
s∗
N corresponding to the set of best achievable performance indices. Toward that end,
we define a convex combination of the terms in (4.30) as an objective function to minimize, which
is the same as H in (4.19). Hence, with the same expression of partial derivatives of H with respect
to Ks1 , · · · , K
s
N in (4.21), the following gradient based iterative algorithm similar to Algorithm 4.2
is proposed to derive the feedback matrices Ks∗1 , · · · , Ks∗N .
Algorithm 4.3.
1. Choose Ks01 (t), · · · , Ks0N (t) as the initial guessing such that the closed loop system matrix
(A+
∑N
j=1BjK
s0
i Cˆi) is asymptotically stable.
2. If (Ai+
∑N
j=1BjK
sk
j Cˆj) is asymptotically stable and ‖maxi=1,··· ,N ∇Kski Hi(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N )‖f
is less than a stopping criteria where∇KsiH(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N ) is defined in (4.21) with Qsi and
Γi defined in (4.27) and Ksi (t) = Kski (t) for all i = 1, · · · , N , then Ksk1 (t), · · · , KskN (t) are
the solutions. Otherwise, go to step 3.
3. Update Ksk1 (t), · · · , KskN (t) according to
K
s(k+1)
i (t) = K
sk
i (t)− ǫi∇KsiH(K
sk
1 , · · · , K
sk
N ) ∀i = 1, · · · , N
where ǫi is the step size. Set k → k + 1 and go to step 2.
By varying the coefficients β1, a noninferior set of the solutions can be generated and an appropriate
choice can be made.
The same idea can be applied to the noninferior strategy design over the infinite time horizon. First
of all, we have the following theorem similar to (4.8).
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Theorem 4.8. For the differential game in an N-agent system under distributed feedback infor-
mation structure defined by system dynamics (2.2) and performance indices (2.5), the strategies in
(4.4) form a noninferior solution with respect to the following performance indices
Jsi =
1
2
∫ ∞
0
(‖x‖2Qsi + x
TΓTi ui + u
T
i Γix+ ‖ui‖
2
Ri
)dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N (4.31)
if the closed-loop system x˙ = (A+∑Nj=1BjKsj Cˆj)x is asymptotically stabilize, where
Qsi = −A
TP − PA+ CˆTi (K
s
i )
TRiK
s
i Cˆi, (4.32a)
Γi(K
s
i ) = −RiK
s
i Cˆi −
1
αi
BTi P, (4.32b)
matrix P is symmetric, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 for all i = 1, · · · , N , and
∑N
j=1 αj = 1.
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function V = 1/2xTPx. The derivative of V along the trajectory
of system (2.2) is the same as (4.28). If the closed-loop system is asymptotically stable, integrating
(4.28) from 0 to ∞ yields
V (∞) = 0 =V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPx+ xT P˙ x+ xTP (Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)]dt
=V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
[(Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
TPx+ xT P˙ x+ xTP (Ax+
N∑
j=1
Bjuj)
+
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
−
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
]dt,
=V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
αj [−‖x‖
2
Qsj
− xTΓTj uj − u
T
j Γjx
− ‖uj‖
2
Rj
+ ‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
]dt,
where matrices Qsi and Γi are defined in (4.32). Hence, denoting that Js =
∑N
j=1 J
s
j where Jsj is
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defined in (4.31), we have
Js = V (0) +
1
2
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
αj‖uj −K
s
j Cˆjx‖
2
Rj
dt.
Since αj ≥ 0 and matrix Rj is positive definite for all j = 1, · · · , N , it is clear from the above
equation that usj = Ksj Cˆjx for all j = 1, · · · , N are the optimal strategies and hence form a
noninferior solution for any given α1, · · · , αN .
For convenience, the values of matrix P in (4.32) is chosen to be the solution to the algebraic
version of the differential Riccati equation in (3.5) by setting P˙ = 0. The definition of best
achievable performance indices in this case is the same as Definition 4.2 with matrices Qsi and Γi
defined in (4.32). with the same expression of partial derivatives of H with respect to Ks1 , · · · , KsN
in (4.24), the same gradient based iterative algorithm as Algorithm 4.3 can be utilized to derive
Ks∗1 , · · · , K
s∗
N corresponding to the best achievable performance indices algorithm for any given
set of parameters α1, · · · , αN . Again, a noninferior set of the solutions can be generated by varying
the coefficients β1 and an appropriate choice can be made.
Note that in the Algorithm 4.3, the initial guessing has to be a stabilizing feedback gain and the
stability of the closed-loop system is verified at every iteration to make sure that the closed-loop
system under the resulting control is asymptotically stable. Therefore, we are confronted with two
issues. One is that whether the system can be stabilized by the structured strategies in the form of
(4.4), and the other is how to find an initial stabilizing control to start the algorithm if the system
is stabilizable. One possible approach is to utilize the Lyapunov stability criterion, which is to find
solution to the following Lyapunov inequality
P
(
A +
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)
+
(
A+
N∑
j=1
BjK
s
j Cˆj
)T
P < 0, (4.33)
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There exist many numerical approaches to solve this problem, one of which is based on the linear
matrix inequality (LMI) technique. The inequality above can be converted into a LMI feasibility
problem and there exist many software tools to solve the LMI feasibility problem efficiently such
as YALMIP [75]. Moreover, if the LMIs are feasible, the software program will automatically
generate a feasible solution, which can be used as the initial stabilizing feedback gain to initialize
Algorithm 4.3. Please refer to [76] for more details for a possible approach.
In this chapter, we considered the game strategy design approach in the multi-agent system under
distributed feedback information structure. The basic idea of this approach is to design structured
feedback strategy for the agents such that these strategies form a Nash equilibrium or noninferior
solution with respect to a set of performance indices that are closest to the original indices. This
approach overcomes several shortcomings in the conventional optimal feedback based approach
and is extended to the game over the infinite time horizon.
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CHAPTER 5: APPLICATIONS
In this chapter, two application examples of the differential games in multi-agent systems are
considered. One is the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) formation control problem and the other
is the multi-pursuer single-evader differential game with limited observations. The former one is
solved using the proposed open-loop noninferior strategy design approach and the latter one is
solved using the best achievable performance indices approach.
5.1 UAV Formation Control Using Differential Game Approach
In this section, we consider N UAVs that are trying to form a prescribed formation and design
open-loop controls for each and every UAV to achieve this objective. The point-mass dynamics of
UAVs are modeled as follows [77] and are shown in Figure 5.1:
x˙i = Vi cos γi cosχi, (5.1a)
y˙i = Vi cos γi sinχi (5.1b)
h˙i = V sin γi (5.1c)
V˙i =
Ti −Di
mi
− g sin γi (5.1d)
γ˙i =
L cosφi −mig cos γi
miVi
(5.1e)
χ˙i =
Li sin φi
miVi cos γi
(5.1f)
for i = 1, · · · , N , where xi is the down-range displacement, yi is the cross-range displacement, hi
is the altitude, Vi is the ground speed which is assumed to be equal to the airspeed in this paper,
γi is the flight path angle, χi is the heading angle, Ti is the engine thrust, Di is the drag, mi is the
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UAV mass, g is the acceleration due to gravity, Li is the lift, and φi is the banking angle. The three
control inputs of UAV i is the banking angle φi, lift Li, and engine thrust Ti.
Ti Vi
γi
Di
yi
xi
hi
Li
mig Vi
χi
ϕi
Figure 5.1: UAV Model
It is shown in [77] that the highly nonlinear UAV model in (5.1) can be pre-linearized using feed-
back linearization to be
x¨i = uxi, y¨i = uyi, h¨i = uhi (5.2)
where uxi, uyi, and uhi are the virtual acceleration control inputs. These virtual control inputs and
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the real control inputs are related through the following equations
φi = tan
−1
(
uyi cosχi − uxi sinχi
(uhi + g) cos γi − (uxi cosχi + uyi sinχi) sin γi
)
(5.3a)
Li = mi
(uhi + g) cos γi − (uxi cosχi + uyi sinχi) sin γi
cosφi
(5.3b)
Ti = mi[(uhi + g) sin γi + (uxi cosχi + uyi sinχi) cos γi] +Di (5.3c)
where tanχi = y˙i/x˙i and sin γi = h˙i/Vi. Therefore, after the virtual control inputs are designed
based on the linear model (5.2), the real control inputs can then be obtained by substituting the
virtual ones into equations in (5.3). Expressing (5.2) in terms of state-space representation yields
z˙i = Azi +Bui, (5.4a)
pi = Cpzi (5.4b)
vi = Cvzi (5.4c)
where zi = [pTi vi]T is the state vector, pi is the position vector, vi is the velocity vector, ui =
[uTxi u
T
yi
uThi]
T is the virtual acceleration control vector,
Ai =

0 1
0 0

⊗ I3, Bi =

0
1

⊗ I3, Cp = [1 0]⊗ I3, Cv = [0 1]⊗ I3,
Suppose that individual UAVs are able to communicate with each other according to a directed
information graph G = (V, E). To achieve the formation requirement, graph G is assumed to be
connected. Since the objective of the UAVs is to form a prescribed formation, assuming that the
desired displacement vector pointing from UAV j to UAV i is µij , the formation requirement can
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be expressed mathematically in terms of the following performance index for UAV i to minimize:
Ji =
∑
eij∈E
1
2
[‖pi(tf )− pj(tf)− µij‖
2 + ‖vi(tf)− vj(tf)‖
2] +
ri
2
∫ tf
0
‖ui‖
2dt (5.5)
for all i = 1, · · · , N , where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm or distance and ri is a positive scalar.
Performance index (5.5) means that UAV i will try to minimize the sum of the terminal formation
errors and terminal velocity errors according to the information graph while at the same time
minimizing its control effort made during the entire process. The larger ri is, the larger penalty is
placed on the control effort. Note that coefficients r1, · · · , rN are not necessarily the same because
the choices of these coefficients reflect the real situation. For instance, if UAV i has sufficient fuel
in its tank, it will naturally choose a small value of ri in order to keep the desired formation with
others actively. On the contrary, if UAV i does not have much fuel left in its tank, it will naturally
choose a large value of ri to preserve its energy or fuel cost. Therefore, we assume that the UAVs
will play a cooperative game and collaborate with each other as a team to achieve the prescribed
formation. This leads to solving the multi-objective optimization problem in (3.3) and finding the
noninferior solution of the game. Toward that end, similar to (3.9), we define new state vectors as
spi(t) = [1 (tf − t)]zi(t) and svi(t) = [0 1]zi(t). (5.6)
Differentiating both sides of (5.6) with respect to t and recalling system dynamics (2.2) yield
s˙pi = B˜pui and s˙vi = B˜vui, (5.7)
where B˜p = (tf − t)I3 and B˜v = I3. Based on the properties spi(tf ) = pi(tf ) and svi(tf ) = vi(tf)
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for spi and svi defined in (5.6), the performance indices in (5.5) can be rewritten as
Ji =
∑
eij∈E
1
2
[‖spi(tf)− spj(tf)− µij‖
2 + ‖svi(tf )− svj(tf)‖
2] +
ri
2
∫ tf
0
‖ui‖
2dt. (5.8)
for all i = 1, · · · , N . The convex combination in (3.3) with Ji defined in (5.8) can be expressed as
J =
N∑
j=1
αj
2
∑
ejk∈E
[‖spj(tf)− spk(tf )− µjk‖
2 + ‖svj(tf)− svk(tf )‖
2]
+
N∑
j=1
αjrj
2
∫ tf
0
‖uj‖
2dt ∀i = 1, · · · , N, (5.9)
where αj > 0 for all j = 1, · · · , N . Similarly to (2.4), we define the Laplacian matrix L = [Lij ] ∈
R
N×N associated with the graph among the N UAVs as follows:
Lij =


−(αi + αj) if eij ∈ E for j 6= i
0 if eij /∈ E for j 6= i
−
N∑
q=1,q 6=i
Liq if j = i
, (5.10)
It is obvious that LT = L because the graph is assumed to be undirected and hence matrixL is pos-
itive semi-definite. Before we present the result of open-loop noninferior solution, the following
lemma is introduced.
Lemma 5.1. All the eigenvalues of matrix M defined by
M = [I2N +W ⊗ (R
−1L)]⊗ I3, (5.11)
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has positive real parts, where
W =

wpp wpv
wvp wvv

 , (5.12a)
wpp =
∫ tf
0
B˜pB˜
T
p dt =
t3f
3
, wpv =
∫ tf
0
B˜pB˜
T
v dt =
t2f
2
(5.12b)
wvp =
∫ tf
0
B˜vB˜
T
p dt =
t2f
2
, wvv =
∫ tf
0
B˜vB˜
T
v dt = tf , (5.12c)
R = diag{µ1r1, · · · , µNrN}, (5.12d)
and diag{·} stands for “diagonal matrix”.
Proof. Firstly, since it is obvious that matrix W defined by (5.12a)-(5.12c) is positive define, all
its eigenvalues are positive. Secondly, since matrix R in (5.12d) is a positive diagonal matrix, the
product of (R−1L) becomes a new weighted Laplacian matrix whose eigenvalues still have non-
negative real parts. Thirdly, since the eigenvalues of matrices’ Kronecker product are the product
of these matrices’ eigenvalues, all the eigenvalues of matrix [W ⊗ (R−1L)⊗ I3] have non-negative
real parts. Therefore, all the eigenvalues of M in (3.14a) have positive real parts.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium solution is now presented as the following theorem similar to
Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 5.1. Given the differential game among N UAVs with system dynamics (5.7) and perfor-
mance indices (5.8), the strategies
u∗i =−
1
αiri
FiM
−1



sp(0)
sv(0)

+Wµµ

+ 1
αiri
B˜Tp µi ∀i = 1, · · · , N (5.13)
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form an open-loop Nash equilibrium, where matrix M is defined in (3.14a),
sp = [s
T
p1 · · · s
T
pN ]
T , sv = [s
T
v1 · · · s
T
vN ]
T , (5.14a)
Fi = [B˜
T
p B˜
T
v ][I2 ⊗ (d
T
i L)⊗ I3], (5.14b)
Wµ =

wpp
wvp

⊗R−1 ⊗ I3, (5.14c)
µ =
[
µT1 · · · , µ
T
N
]T
, (5.14d)
µi =
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)µij ∀i = 1, · · · , N, (5.14e)
L is the Laplacian matrix defined in (5.10), di ∈ RN is a vector with the ith entry equal to 1 and the
other entries equal to 0, and scalars wpp and wvp are defined in (5.12b) and (5.12c), respectively.
Proof. We define the Hamiltonian for UAV i as
Hi =
N∑
j=1
αjrj
2
‖uj‖
2 +
N∑
j=1
λTpjB˜puj +
N∑
j=1
λTvjB˜vuj
where vectors λpi and λvi are the Lagrangian multipliers. According to the well-known Pontrya-
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gin’s minimum principle [71], the necessary conditions for optimality are
s˙pi =
∂Hi
∂λpi
= B˜pui, s˙vi =
∂Hi
∂λvi
= B˜vui (5.15a)
λ˙pi = −
∂Hi
∂spi
= 0, λ˙vi = −
∂Hi
∂svi
= 0, (5.15b)
λpi(tf) =
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[spi(tf)− spj(tf)− µij], (5.15c)
λvi(tf ) =
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[svi(tf )− svj(tf)], (5.15d)
∂Hi
∂ui
= αiriui + B˜
T
p λpi + B˜
T
v λvi = 0,
∂2Hi
∂u2i
= αiri > 0. (5.15e)
Conditions (5.15b)-(5.15d) indicate that λpi and λvi are constant vectors. Substituting them into
(5.15e) yields
ui =−
1
αiri
B˜Tp λpi −
1
αiri
B˜Tv λvi
=−
1
αiri
B˜Tp
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[spi(tf )− spj(tf )− µij]
−
1
αiri
B˜Tv
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[svi(tf )− svj(tf)]. (5.16)
Substituting (5.16) into (5.15a) and integrating both sides from 0 to tf yield
spi(tf ) +
wpp
αiri
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[spi(tf)− spj(tf)]
+
wpv
αiri
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[svi(tf)− svj(tf )] = spi(0) +
wpp
αiri
µi (5.17)
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and
svi(tf) +
wvp
αiri
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[spi(tf )− spj(tf )]
+
wvv
αiri
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)[svi(tf )− svj(tf)] = svi(0) +
wvp
αiri
µi (5.18)
where scalars wpp, wpv, wvp, wvv are defined in (5.12b)-(5.12c) and µi is defined in (5.14e). Com-
bining (5.17) and (5.18) and stacking them from i = 1 to i = N yield

sp(tf )
sv(tf)

 = M−1



sp(0)
sv(0)

+



wpp
wvp

⊗ R−1 ⊗ I3

µ

 (5.19)
where vectors sp and sv are defined in (5.14a), matrix M is defined in (5.11) and invertible accord-
ing to Lemma 5.1, and vector µ is defined in (5.14d). Therefore, rewriting (5.16) as
ui =−
1
αiri
Fi

sp(tf )
sv(tf )

+ 1
αiri
B˜Tp µi (5.20)
where Fi is defined in (5.14b) and substituting (5.19) into (5.20) yields (5.13). Since sp(0), sv(0)
are in fact functions of the initial state z(0) through (5.6), strategies u∗1, · · · , u∗N in (5.13) form an
open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Due to the information graph constraint, the following terminal position and velocity estimation
law similar to Theorem 3.4 is presented.
Theorem 5.2. If UAV i updates its vector hi in continuous time from any initial guess hpi(0) and
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hvi(0) according to

h˙pi
h˙vi

 =g{

spi(0)
svi(0)

+ 1
αiri

wpp
wvp

µi −

hpi
hvi


−
1
αiri
(W ⊗ I3)
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)



hpi
hvi

−

hpj
hvj



} (5.21)
where g is a positive scalar, matrix W is defined in (5.12a), and vector µi is defined in (5.14e),
then
lim
τ→∞

hp(τ)
hv(τ)

 =

sp(tf )
sv(tf)

 , (5.22)
where hp = [hTp1 · · ·hTpN ]T , hv = [hTv1 · · ·hTvN ]T , and vectors sp(tf ) and sv(tf ) are as defined in
(5.19).
Proof. Stacking equation (5.21) from i = 1 to i = N yields

h˙p
h˙v

 = g



sp(0)
sv(0)

−M

hp
hv

+Wµµ

 . (5.23)
where matrix M is defined in (5.11), matrix Wµ is defined in (5.14c), and vector µ is defined in
(5.14d). Since all the eigenvalues of matrix M has positive real parts as shown in Lemma 5.1, ma-
trix (−M) is Hurwitz. Therefore, linear system with respect to [hp; hv] in (5.23) is asymptotically
stable starting from any initial condition h(0) and will converge to the equilibrium, i.e.,
lim
τ→∞

hp(τ)
hv(τ)

 = M−1



sp(0)
sv(0)

+Wµµ

 .
where the right hand side of the above equation is equal to the vector [sp(tf); sv(tf)] defined in
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(5.19). Therefore, equation (5.22) holds.
Given the state estimation law in (5.21), an online open-loop Nash strategy design algorithm simi-
lar to (3.22) is proposed as follows:
u∗i =−
1
αiri
B˜Tp
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)(hpi − hpj − µij)−
1
αiri
B˜Tv
∑
eij∈E
(αi + αj)(hvi − hvj), (5.24)
where hpi and hvi satisfy the equation (5.21) for all i = 1, · · · , N .
For illustration, we apply this online open-loop Nash strategy design algorithm to a five-UAV
system. The parameters in [49] are utilized for this simulation: The weight of UAV i is mi = 20kg
for all i = 1, · · · , N . The gravity constant is g = 9.81kg/m2. The drag Di is calculated as follows
[78]:
Di =
0.5ρ(Vi − Vwi)
2SCD0 + 2kdk
2
nL
2/g2
ρ(Vi − Vwi)2S
where ρ is the atmospheric density and equal to 1.225kg/m3, Vwi is the gust, S is the wing area
and equal to 1.37m2, CD0 is the zero-lift drag coefficient and equal to 0.02, kd is the induced drag
coefficient and equal to 0.1, and kn is the load-factor effectiveness and equal to 1. The gust Vwi is
modeled as follows [79]:
Vwi = V¯wi + δVwi
V¯wi = 0.215Vmlog10(hi) + 0.285Vm
where V¯wi is the normal wind shear, Vm is the mean wind speed and equal to 4m/s at the altitude of
80m, and δVwi is the wind gust turbulence on UAV i and assumed to be a Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and a standard deviation equal to 0.09Vm. The real control inputs of the UAV have
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the following constraints: Ti < 125N , −294.3N < Li < 392.4N , and −80◦ ≤ φi ≤ 80◦ for all
i = 1, · · · , N . We assume that the UAVs are trying to form a desired V-shape in the same altitude
shown in Figure 5.2 and the underlying undirected information graph is also shown in this figure.
UAV 1
UAV 2
UAV 4
Aircraft 3
UAV 5
UAV 3
Figure 5.2: V-shape formation and information graph
Hence, UAV 1 will act as a reference for the other UAVs. The corresponding graph Laplacian
matrix is
L =


2α1 + α2 + α3 −α1 − α2 −α1 − α3 0 0
−α1 − α2 α1 + α4 + 2α2 0 −α4 − α2 0
−α1 − α3 0 α1 + α5 + 2α3 0 −α3 − α5
0 −α2 − α4 0 α2 + α4 0
0 0 −α3 − α5 0 α3 + α5


.
where 0 ≤ α1, · · · , α5 ≤ 1 are the convex parameters and
∑5
i=j αj = 1. The desired offset vectors
of the formation among the UAVs are
µ21 =


−100
−100
0

m, µ31 =


100
−100
0

m, µ42 =


−100
−100
0

m, µ53 =


100
−100
0

m.
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The initial positions of the UAVs are
p1(0) =


0
0
90

m, p2(0) =


−80
0
80

m, p3(0) =


90
0
70

m, p4(0) =


−120
0
60

m, p5(0) =


150
0
65

m.
The initial velocities of the UAVs are
v1(0) =


0
50
0

m/s, v2(0) =


0
60
0

m/s, v3(0) =


0
40
0

m/s, v4(0) =


0
65
0

m/s, v5(0) =


0
45
0

m/s.
The five UAVs’ performance indices are given by (5.5) with tf = 30 and ri = 1 for all i = 1, · · · , 5.
With αi = 0.2 for all i = 1, · · · , 5, the the UAVs’ trajectories derived using the online open-loop
Nash strategy design algorithm (5.24) are shown in Figure 5.3. The left plot shows the trajectories
in 3-dimensional space and the right plot shows the trajectories in x − y plane. In the figure, the
circles indicate the UAVs’ initial positions and the triangles indicate the UAVs’ terminal positions.
86
−400
−200
0
200
400
0
500
1000
1500
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
x(m)
y(m)
h
(m
)
Aircraft 1
Aircraft 2
Aircraft 3
Aircraft 4
Aircraft 5
−200 −100 0 100 200 300
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
x(m)
y
(m
)
Figure 5.3: UAVs’ trajectories in 3D and x− y plane
Clearly, the UAVs’ positions form the desired V-formation at the terminal time. For illustrative
purpose, the UAVs’ trajectories on x axis, y axis, and h axis are shown independently in Figure 5.4.
Moreover, the UAVs’ velocities in the three axis and three real control inputs obtained according
to the relationship (5.3) are also shown in Figure 5.4. All of real control inputs are within the
specified constraints.
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Figure 5.4: UAVs’ positions, velocities, and real control inputs
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5.2 Multi-Pursuer Single-Evader Differential Game with Limited Observations
In this section, we consider a differential game over a finite time horizon in which only the evader
is assumed to have global sensing capability which allows it to observe all the pursuers at all times.
Each pursuer, on the other hand, has a limited sensing capability which allows it to observe the
evader and/or other pursuers only if they fall within its sensing range. A practical example of such
a situation occurs when a well-equipped UAV with a very wide range of sensing capability must
evade several (possibly a large number of) weakly-equipped pursuing UAVs. In what follows,
we derive the feedback Nash strategies for both the pursuers and evader using the best achievable
performance indices based approach.
We define the following displacement vector zi between pursuer i and the evader e as shown in
Figure 5.5
zi = xe − xi ∀i = 1, · · · , N. (5.25)
where xe ∈ Rn is the evader’s position vector and xi ∈ Rn is pursuer i’s position vector.
Pursuer 1
Pursuer 2
Pursuer N
Evader
…...
Figure 5.5: Displacement vectors
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We assume that a collective objective of the pursuers is to minimize the sum of the weighted
distances between the evader and themselves at a terminal time tf > 0 while at the same time
minimizing these distances and their control efforts over the time interval [0, tf ]. Hence, the group
of pursuers tries to minimize the following performance index:
Jp =
N∑
j=1
fpj
2
‖zj(tf )‖
2 +
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
(qpj
2
‖zj‖
2 +
rj
2
‖uj‖
2
)
dt, (5.26)
where uj is pursuer j’s velocity control input, ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm, and scalars fpj , qpj , and
rj are positive weights for j = 1, · · · , N . On the other hand, we assume that the evader’s objective
is to maximize the sum of the weighted terminal distances between the pursuers and itself while at
the same time maximizing these distances and minimizing its control effort over the time interval
[0, tf ]. Hence, the evader will try to minimize the performance index:
Je =−
N∑
j=1
fej
2
‖zj(tf)‖
2 +
∫ tf
0
N∑
j=1
(
−
qej
2
‖zj‖
2
)
+
re
2
‖ue‖
2dt, (5.27)
where ue is the evader’s velocity control input and scalars fej , qej , and re are positive weights
for j = 1, · · · , N . To express the system dynamics more compactly, we define the vector z =
[zT1 ; · · · z
T
N ]
T which, along with (5.25), yields
z˙ = Beue +Bpup. (5.28)
where matrix Be = 1N ⊗ In, 1N ∈ RN×1 is a vector with all the entries equal to 1, up =
[uT1 · · · u
T
N ]
T
, Bp = −IN ⊗ In. The performance indices (5.26) and (5.27) can be rewritten
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as
Jp =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fp +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖z‖2Qp + ‖up‖
2
Rp)dt, (5.29a)
Je =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fe +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖z‖2Qe + ‖ue‖
2
Re)dt, (5.29b)
where ‖z‖2F = zTFz and
Fp = diag{fp1, · · · , fpN} ⊗ In, Fe = −diag{fe1, · · · , feN} ⊗ In
Qp = diag{qp1 , · · · , qpN} ⊗ In, Qe = −diag{qe1, · · · , qeN} ⊗ In
Rp = diag{r1, · · · , rN} ⊗ In,
and “diag” stands for “diagonal matrix”. Hence, given the system dynamics in (5.28) and per-
formance indices in (5.29), a differential nonzero-sum game between the group of pursuers and
the evader is formed. To accurately model the sensing capabilities and limited observations of
the pursuers, we assume that pursuer i has a sensing range defined by a sensing radius ri > 0.
If the Euclidean distance between pursuer i and the evader is less than or equal to ri, that is,
‖xi − xe‖ ≤ ri, then pursuer i is able to observe the evader, otherwise, pursuer i cannot observe
the evader. Consequently, we define a binary scalar hi(t) to represent pursuer i’s ability to observe
the evader at time t as follows:
hi(t) =


1 if ‖xi(t)− xe(t)‖ ≤ ri
0 if ‖xi(t)− xe(t)‖ > ri
. (5.30)
Similarly, if the the Euclidean distance between pursuer i and pursuer j is less than or equal to ri,
that is, ‖xi − xj‖ ≤ ri, then pursuer i is able to observe pursuer j, otherwise, pursuer i cannot
observe pursuer j. Consequently, we can use an unweighted Laplacian matrix, L(t) = [Lij(t)] ∈
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R
N×N
, similar to (2.4) to described the observations among the pursuers at every instant of time t,
where
Lij(t) =


−1 if ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ ≤ ri for j 6= i
0 if ‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖ > ri for j 6= i
−
N∑
l=1,l 6=i
Lil if j = i
(5.31)
for i, j = 1, · · · , N .
For the formulated pursuit-evasion game with limited observations, the following practical issue
needs to be noticed: Although the evader has sufficiently wide observation range to observe all the
pursuers’ positions at every instant of time, it really has no information on the individual pursuers’
observation radii r1, · · · , rN or how these pursuers obverse each other among themselves. There-
fore, we assume that during the game process, the evader has no knowledge of the existence of
limited observations among the pursuers and the overall information topology. On the other hand,
for the pursuers, we assume that all of them are aware of their limited observation capabilities as
well as the evader’s global observation capability.
Given the formulated pursuit-evasion game problem, every player is able to solve for the Nash
equilibrium using the well-known Riccati equation approach, however, only the evader who ob-
serves all the pursuers can implement this Nash strategy. According to [7], for the game defined
by system (5.28) and performance indices (5.29), the classical linear feedback Nash strategies are
u∗p = −R
−1
p B
T
p Ppz (5.32a)
u∗e = −R
−1
e B
T
e Pez, (5.32b)
92
where matrices Pp and Pe are solutions to the coupled differential Riccati equations
P˙p + Qp − PpBpR
−1
p B
T
p Pp − PpBeR
−1
e B
T
e Pe − PeBeR
−1
e B
T
e Pp = 0 (5.33a)
P˙e +Qe − PeBpR
−1
p B
T
p Pp − PpBpR
−1
p B
T
p Pe − PeBeR
−1
e B
T
e Pe = 0. (5.33b)
with boundary condition Pp(tf) = Fp and Pe(tf ) = Fe. The expressions for the evader’s Nash
strategy in (5.32b) is indeed linear feedback controls of the global state vector z. Since the evader
has no knowledge of the existence of the pursuers’ limited observations, it naturally implements
the feedback Nash strategy (5.32b) as its control input during the game, assuming that the pursuers
are implementing strategy (5.32a). From the pursuers’ perspective, since each of them has limited
observation, there is no way for them to implement their Nash strategy described in (5.32a). There-
fore, a Nash strategy design approach must be proposed for the group of pursuers to accommodate
their limited observations constraint while at the same time maintaining a Nash equilibrium with
the evader’s strategy (5.32b). First of all, the pursuers’ admissible control up needs to be prop-
erly structured in order to fit into the limited observation constraint that each pursuer must operate
under. Toward this end, we propose the following structured feedback strategies for the pursuers:
usi =hi(t)Kie(t)zi(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
+Kip(t)
N∑
j=1
Lij(t)zj(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
∀i = 1, · · · , N (5.34)
where scalar hi(t) is defined in (5.30), scalar Lij(t) is defined in (5.31), matrices Kie ∈ Rn×n and
Kip ∈ R
n×n are feedback gains to be determined. Term a in (5.34) represents a control component
of pursuer i to chase the evader directly if it observes the evader. Term b in (5.34) is known as a
cooperative control component, that is, a feedback control of the difference between the position of
pursuer i and those of the pursuers that it observes. The expression of pursuer i’s control in (5.34)
means that when pursuer i is able to observe the evader (i.e. when hi(t) = 1), it will chase the
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evader while at the same time it follows the nearby pursuers that it can observe. When pursuer i is
unable to observe the evader (i.e. when hi(t) = 0), it has no choice but to merely follow the nearby
pursuers. The control expression in (5.34) can be rewritten using the more compact notation as
usi =Kie[0 · · · 0 (hiIn) 0 · · · 0]z +Kip[(Li1In) · · · (LiNIn)]z , MiCiz, (5.35)
where Mi = [Kie Kip] ∈ Rn×2n and
Ci =

0 · · · 0 (hiIn) 0 · · · 0
(Li1In) · · · · · · (LiNIn)

 ,
where hi and Lij are defined in (5.30) and (5.31). Therefore, the pursuers’ control vector usp =
[(us1)
T · · · (usN)
T ]T can be written as usp = Mpz, where
Mp = [(M1C1)
T · · · (MNCN)
T ]T . (5.36)
The problem now reduces to finding a set of matrices M∗1 , · · · ,M∗N such that feedback gain M∗p =
[(M∗1C1)
T · · · (M∗NCN)
T ]T and the resulting pursuers’ strategy
us∗p = M
∗
p z (5.37)
can still form a Nash equilibrium with the evader’s strategy u∗e in (5.32b). As we mentioned in
Chapter 4, using the optimal output feedback based approach, all the players’ structured controls
and the corresponding feedback gains need to be simultaneously parameterized and optimized
with respect to the given set of performance indices to obtain the Nash equilibrium. This cannot
be implemented in our game setup since as mentioned earlier, the evader will be implementing the
Nash strategy (5.32b) and hence it is not possible to simultaneously parameterize and optimize it
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along with the strategy of the pursuers to form a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the best achievable
performance indices based approach is utilized to design Nash strategies for the pursuers. The
following result similar to Theorem 4.5 is presented.
Theorem 5.3. For the pursuit-evasion game described by system dynamics (5.28) and performance
indices (5.29), for an arbitrary set of matrices M1, · · · ,MN , the strategies u∗e in (5.32b) and usp =
Mpz form a Nash equilibrium
Jsp(u
s
p, u
∗
e) ≤ J
s
p(up, u
∗
e), ∀up ∈ Up (5.38a)
Jse (u
s
p, u
∗
e) ≤ J
s
e (u
s
p, ue), ∀ue ∈ Ue, (5.38b)
with respect to performance indices
Jsp =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fp +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖z‖2Qsp − u
T
p Γz − z
TΓTup + ‖up‖
2
Rp)dt, (5.39a)
Jse =
1
2
‖z(tf )‖
2
Fe +
1
2
∫ tf
0
(‖z‖2Qse + ‖ue‖
2
Re)dt, (5.39b)
where
Qsp = M
T
p RpMp − PpBpR
−1
p B
T
p Pp +Qp (5.40a)
Γ = BTp Pp +RpMp, (5.40b)
Qse = −PeBpR
−1
p (RpMp +B
T
p Pp)− (RpMp +B
T
p Pp)
TR−1p B
T
p Pe +Qe. (5.40c)
matrices Pp and Pe are the solutions to (5.33) and matrix Mp is as given in (5.36).
Proof. Consider Lyapunov functions
Vp =
1
2
zTPpz and Ve =
1
2
zTPez. (5.41)
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Differentiating Vp in (5.41) with respect to t and integrating it from 0 to tf yield
Vp(tf)− Vp(0) =
1
2
∫ tf
0
[
− ‖z‖2Qsp − ‖u‖
2
Rp + u
T
p Γz + z
TΓTup
+ 2zTPpBe(ue +R
−1
e B
T
e Pez) + ‖up −Mpz‖
2
Rp
]
dt.
Hence,
Jsp =Vp(0) +
∫ tf
0
1
2
‖up −Mpz‖
2
Rp + z
TPsBe(ue +R
−1
e B
T
e Pez)dt, (5.42)
where Jsp is defined in (5.39a). Similarly, we can show that
Jse =Ve(0) +
∫ tf
0
1
2
‖ue +R
−1
e B
T
e Pez‖
2
Re − z
TPeBp(up −Mpz)dt, (5.43)
where Jse is defined in (5.39b). Since Rp and Re are positive definite, it is obvious from (5.42) and
(5.43) that given performance indices defined in (5.39), the inequalities in (2.8) holds for up = Mpz
and u∗e = −R−1e BTe Pe. Hence, strategies (5.32b) and (5.37) form a Nash equilibrium with respect
to performance indices in (5.39). Clearly, if Mp can be written as Mp = −R−1p BTp Pp, then Jsp in
(5.39a) becomes identical to (5.29a) and Jse in (5.39b) becomes identical to (5.29b).
Therefore, according to the definition of best achievable performance index in (4.1), to find the
optimal matrix M∗p (t) corresponding to the best achievable performance indices, we need to solve
a multi-objective optimization problem of minimizing ‖Qsp−Qp‖2f , ‖S‖2f , and ‖Qse−Qe‖2f simul-
taneously. Hence, we let H(t) in (4.19) be
H(t) =β1‖Q
s
p −Qp‖
2
f + β2‖S‖
2
f + β3‖Q
s
e −Qe‖
2
f
=β1Tr[(Qsp −Qp)
2] + β2Tr(STS) + β3Tr[(Qse −Qe)
2] (5.44)
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where 0 < βj < 1 for j = 1, 2, 3, and
∑3
j=1 βj = 1. Since Mp is as defined in (5.36), the
minimization in (4.20) is actually done with respect to M1(t), · · · ,MN(t). With the gradient of
H(t) with respect to M1(t), · · · ,MN(t) expressed as follows:
∇MiH =(d
T
i ⊗ In)[4α1RpMp(Q
s
p −Qp) + 2α2RpS − 4α3B
T
p Pe(Q
s
e −Qe)]C
T
i . (5.45)
for all i = 1, · · · , N , where di ∈ RN is a vector with the ith entry equal to 1 and the other
entries equal to 0, a gradient based iterative algorithms similar to Algorithm 4.2 can be adopted to
find matrices M∗1 (t), · · · ,M∗N(t). Also note that by varying the coefficients β1, β2, β3 in (5.44), a
noninferior set of the solutions can be generated. An appropriate choice of these coefficients can
be made to place a desired emphasis on the importance of minimizing each of the three terms in
(5.44) as compared to the other two.
For illustrative purpose, let us consider a three-pursuer single-evader differential game taking place
in a planar environment and defined over a time interval [0, 3]. Suppose that xi = [xTi1 xTi2]T ∈ R2
represents player i’s position and ui = [uTi1 uTi2]T ∈ R2 represents player i’s velocity control.
Hence, in equation (2.2), we have
Be =


I2
I2
I2

 and Bp = −


I2 0 0
0 I2 0
0 0 I2

 .
The performance indices are given by (5.29) with tf = 3, Fp = Qp = qI6, Rp = I6, Fe = Qe = I6,
andRe = I2, where q is a positive scalar that can be varied to analyze different scenarios. As shown
in Figure 5.6, we assume that the pursuers’ initial positions are x1(0) = (−3, 0), x2(0) = (3, 0),
x3(0) = (5, 1), the evader’s initial position is xe(0) = (0, 1), and the pursuers’ sensing radii are
the same and equal to 4. Clearly, at t = 0, pursuer 1 can only observe the evader, pursuer 2 can
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Figure 5.6: Initial positions of three pursuers and single evader
observe the evader and pursers 3, and pursuer 3 can only observe pursuer 2. Further, we assume
that the evader is captured if the minimum distance between the pursuers and evader is less than a
capture radius σ = 0.1, which is shown as a light black circle centered at the evader in Figure 5.6.
In this example, we will consider two different scenarios:
• Scenarios 1: q = 1. Pursuers put equal emphasis on minimizing their distances to the evader
and minimizing their control effort.
• Scenario 2: q = 5. Pursuers put more emphasis on minimizing their distances to the evader
than on minimizing their control effort.
Evader’s Strategy: The Evader solves the coupled differential Riccati equations (5.33) and im-
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plements the corresponding Nash strategy. This yields solutions Pp and Pe in the following form:
Pp =


Pp1 Pp2 Pp2
Pp2 Pp1 Pp2
Pp2 Pp2 Pp1

⊗ I2, Pe =


Pe1 Pe2 Pe2
Pe2 Pe1 Pe2
Pe2 Pe2 Pe1

⊗ I2
where the plots of Pp1(t), Pp2(t), Pe1(t), and Pe2(t) for both scenarios are shown in Figure 5.7.
Hence, the evader’s feedback Nash strategies (5.32b) in terms of z1, z2, z3 can be expressed as
u∗e =(Pe1 + 2Pe2)(z1 + z2 + z3).
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Figure 5.7: Plots of Pp1(t), Pp2(t), Pe1(t), and Pe2(t)
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Pursuers’ Strategy: To derive the pursuers’ strategy, we assume that for implementation purpose,
the pursuers perform sensing only at discrete instants of time t0, t1, · · · , t299, where t0 = 0, t300 =
tf = 3. Since tj−tj−1 = 0.01 is quite small for all j = 1, · · · , 300, we assume that the observations
among the players can be regarded to be constant within such a small time interval (tj − tj−1). We
also assume that the pursuers will carry out the proposed best achievable performance indices
approach with the following (arbitrary) choice of coefficients in (5.44): α1 = 1/4, α2 = 1/2, and
α3 = 1/4.
Scenario 1: In this scenario, the motion trajectories of the pursuers and evader over time are shown
in Figure 5.8. The distances between the pursuers and evader over time are shown in Figure 5.9
where the capture radius σ = 0.1 is shown in terms of a dashed black horizontal line. Clearly,
in this scenario, none of the pursuer is able to capture the evader when the final time tf = 3 is
reached. Furthermore, the change in the observations among the players is reflected in the changes
of hi(t) in (5.30) and Laplacian matrix with Lij(t) defined in (5.31).
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Figure 5.8: Motion trajectories of the pursuers and evader for Scenario 1
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Figure 5.9: Distances between the pursuers and evader for Scenario 1
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In this scenario, the values of h1(t), h2(t), h3(t) and the value of the Laplacian matrix L(t) have
changed as follows:
h1(t) =

 1 0 ≤ t ≤ 2.910 2.91 < t ≤ 3
h2(t) =

 1 0 ≤ t ≤ 2.910 2.91 < t ≤ 3
h3(t) = 0 0 < t ≤ 3
and L(t) =




0 0 0
0 1 −1
0 −1 1

 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.16


1 −1 0
−1 2 −1
0 −1 1

 0.16 < t ≤ 0.52


1 −1 0
−1 1 0
0 0 0

 0.52 < t ≤ 3
.
The change in hi(t) means that pursuers 1 and 2 lose observation of the evader after t = 2.91 while
pursuer 3 was never able to observe the evader for the entire game. The change in the Laplacian
matrix essentially means that only pursuers 2 and 3 can observe each other for t ∈ [0, 0.16], pursuer
2 can observe pursuers 1 and 3 for t ∈ (0.16, 0.52] while pursuers 1 and 3 cannot observe each
other at this time interval, and only pursuers 1 and 2 can observe each other for the rest time
t ∈ (0.52, 3].
Scenario 2: In this scenario, the motion trajectories of the pursuers and evader are shown in
Figure 5.10. The distances between the pursuers and evader are shown in Figure 5.11 where the
the capture radius σ = 0.1 is shown in terms of a dashed black horizontal line. Clearly, in this
scenario, pursuer 2 is the first one to capture the evader at t = 1.2.
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Figure 5.10: Motion trajectories of the pursuers and evader for Scenario 2
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Figure 5.11: Distances between the pursuers and evader for Scenario 2
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During the entire game, the values of h1(t), h2(t), h3(t) and the value of the Laplacian matrix L(t)
have changed as follows
h1(t) = 1 0 < t ≤ 3
h2(t) = 1 0 < t ≤ 3
h3(t) =

 0 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.291 0.29 < t ≤ 3
and L(t) =




0 0 0
0 1 −1
0 −1 1

 0 ≤ t ≤ 0.11


1 −1 0
−1 2 −1
0 −1 1

 0.11 < t ≤ 0.41


2 −1 −1
−1 2 −1
−1 −1 2

 0.41 < t ≤ 3
The change of hi(t) means that after t = 0.29, all the pursuers are able to observe the evader.
The change of the Laplacian matrix means that only pursuers 2 and 3 can observe each other for
t ∈ [0, 0.11], pursuer 2 can observe pursuers 1 and 3 for t ∈ (0.11, 0.41] while pursuers 1 and 3
cannot observe each other at this time interval, and all the pursuers are able to observe each other
for the rest time t ∈ (0.41, 3].
It would be interesting to determine a critical value qc of q which separates the escape and capture
regions of the evader. That is, if q < qc, the evader escapes and if q ≥ qc the evader is captured at
a time instant t ∈ [0, 3]. For this game, the critical value of q has been determined to be qc = 1.38.
Figure 5.12 shows the motion trajectories of the pursuers and evader when q = qc = 1.38. Figure
5.13 shows the distances between the pursuers and evader when q = qc = 1.38, where the capture
time occurs at t = 1.55.
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Figure 5.12: Trajectories of the pursuers and evader when q = qc = 1.38
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Figure 5.13: Distances between the pursuers and evader when q = qc = 1.38
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
This dissertation focuses on the Nash strategy and noninferior strategy designs for linear quadratic
differential games in the multi-agent system under distributed open-loop and feedback information
structures. We first introduced the basic concepts in the game theory and multi-agent control
systems, reviewed the existing results in these fields, raised the motivation of this research, and
defined the scope of this dissertation. As the main results, we proposed novel open-loop and
feedback game strategy design approaches to overcome the conventional approaches’ incapabilities
in dealing with the distributed information constraint. The contributions of this dissertation can be
addressed as follows:
1. In terms of the open-loop strategy design, the proposed approach integrates a distributed
state estimation algorithm into the classical open-loop game strategy.
– The proposed approach can be carried out in a distributed manner where every agent is
able to implement it by exchanging the state estimates with other agents according to
the information graph.
– The proposed approach renders approximate strategies of the original open-loop Nash
or noninferior strategies which can only be implemented under global information and
these approximate strategies can be made arbitrarily close to the original open-loop
Nash or noninferior strategies.
2. In terms of the feedback strategy design, the proposed approach is based on the concept of
best achievable performance indices.
– The proposed approach renders structured strategies which has structured feedback
gain matrices that conform to the information graph constraint.
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– Compared with the classical output feedback optimal approach, the proposed approach
renders strategies that are independent on the initial state of the system and does not
requires all the agents to parameterize and optimize the feedback gain matrices simul-
taneously.
Two illustrative application examples on an unmanned aerial vehicle formation control problem
and a multi-pursuer single-evader differential game problem with limited observations were solved
and the simulation results corresponding to different scenarios are presented.
With the already obtained results, the future research can be carried out in the following possible
directions:
For the open-loop design, the possible directions are as follows. First, applying the idea in the pro-
posed open-loop strategy design approach to feedback strategy design will be significant because if
the feedback strategy design approach is obtained, then the problems of more realistic importance
including the differential games for multi-agent systems under time-varying information graph can
be tackled. Second, the proposed approach can be successfully implemented if the convergence
condition of the state estimation law is valid, which is the case for most of the consensus prob-
lems. Therefore, exploring the condition in more details or finding conditions where the condition
always holds will be interesting and very important.
For the feedback design, the best achievable performance indices approach requires an authority to
carry out the computing algorithm with the knowledge of the overall information topology and all
the agents’ information and then distribute the resulting game strategy to each and every agent. In
order to have an better adaptation to the time-varying information graph, an approximate approach
to the proposed approach that requires less information need be proposed.
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